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Causal Responsibility and Patent 
Infringement 
Dmitry Karshtedt* 
It is not uncommon for multiple parties in the stream of commerce—
manufacturers, distributors, end users—to be involved in the infringement of a 
single patent. Yet courts continue to struggle with such scenarios. Attempts to 
deal with them—particularly when plaintiffs asserted so-called method patents, 
which cover specific “steps,” or actions—have produced results that defy 
commonsense notions of legal responsibility. In method patent cases, the 
patentee must clear much higher legal hurdles to prevail against a 
manufacturer who designed and supplied an infringing device than against an 
end user who simply bought that device and operated it as intended. The 
manufacturer can lose only upon proof of fault, while the user is subject to strict 
liability—a result that seems backwards because the manufacturer is clearly 
the more responsible party. Even greater difficulties arise when the 
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manufacturer performs some steps of a method patent and the user performs 
the others, giving rise to a so-called “divided infringement” problem. One such 
case, Akamai v. Limelight, has been in litigation for over ten years and 
generated multiple appellate opinions, including a decision by the Supreme 
Court. Although the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finally resolved 
Akamai in a fact-specific fashion, no comprehensive solution to the divided 
infringement problem is in sight. 
I explain that these problems persist because patent law formalistically 
clings to what I term the “performer/non-performer distinction,” which holds 
that physical performance of an act is the linchpin of legal accountability. I then 
contend that they can be solved by reading the Patent Act in view of the principle 
of causal responsibility, which pervades the law and rests on a firm 
philosophical foundation. Simply put, this principle holds that one is 
responsible for the actions of others that one has caused, leading to the legal 
effect of imputing the act of the “causee” (in patent cases, often the user) to the 
causer (e.g., the manufacturer). I draw on examples from criminal law and tort 
law to elucidate this principle and demonstrate its consistency with the Patent 
Act. I also maintain that applying causal responsibility in patent law would 
lead to three practical and sensible results. First, doing so would effectively 
lower the mens rea barriers needed to establish the liability of manufacturers 
who supply devices configured so that their only intended use by a passive 
customer results in the performance of steps of some method patent. Second, it 
would provide a path for resolving the vexing problem of divided infringement 
exemplified by Akamai. Third, the proposed approach may in some cases help 
to shift the burden of ensuring compliance with existing patents from end users 
to manufacturers, which is as it should be. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 567 
I.   MULTI-PARTY PATENT INFRINGEMENT ................................ 577 
A.  The Problem of Method Claims ............................... 577 
B.  A Brief History of Patent Infringement  
Liability of Non-performing Parties ........................ 580 
C.  Indirect Infringement and Its Discontents .............. 586 
D.  “Divided Infringement” and Its Discontents ........... 592 
E.  The Commonality Between Non-performer  
and Partial Performer Scenarios ............................. 597 
II.   THE CONCEPTS OF CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY AND  
OF CAUSING ACTS OF OTHERS ............................................. 599 
A.  Selected Causation Concepts ................................... 599 
B.  Causing Acts of Others ............................................ 601 
III.  CAUSAL IMPUTATION IN CRIMINAL LAW AND TORT LAW ..... 605 
A.  General Considerations ........................................... 605 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
2017] CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY & INFRINGEMENT 567 
B.  Causal Responsibility in Action .............................. 609 
1.  Criminal Law ................................................ 609 
2.  Trespass ........................................................ 615 
3.  Products Liability ......................................... 617 
C.  Smaller Causal Role of Aiders and Abettors as  
a Justification for a Higher Level of Mens Rea ....... 621 
1.  Criminal Law ................................................ 621 
2.  Tort Law ....................................................... 624 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT LAW ......................................... 624 
A.  The Value of Causal Responsibility ......................... 624 
B.  Indirect Infringement .............................................. 627 
1.  Applying the Framework.............................. 627 
2.  Implementation Under the Patent Act ........ 631 
C.  Divided Infringement .............................................. 636 
D.  Causal Responsibility in Other Areas of IP ............. 641 




Cases in which more than one party is involved in infringing a 
patent embody one of the most vexing areas of patent law. These multi-
party problems become particularly salient when plaintiffs assert so-
called method patents, which cover specific “steps,” or actions.1 In the 
stream of commerce, manufacturers, distributors, and end users might 
all participate, to varying degrees, in the infringement of such patents.2 
The manufacturer might design a product whose operation entails 
performing the claim’s steps, the distributor might sell it, and the end 
user might actually operate the product. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. 
Gateway, Inc., a case involving a patent covering the functionality of 
scheduling appointments using a graphical interface, illustrates this 
kind of a situation.3 The infringing steps took place when a Microsoft 
Outlook user clicked on a time slot in the calendar window and typed in 
a title—say, “Breakfast meeting.”4 But performance of these steps was 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for Indirect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 911, 923–24 n.53 (2014) (discussing method claims). Section I.A, infra, explains method 
claims in detail. 
 2.  See generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Seller and 
User Liability in Intellectual Property Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 3.  580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 4.  Id. at 1317–20. 
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made possible by Microsoft, a software manufacturer that designed 
Outlook and introduced it into the stream of commerce. 
One would think that the requirements to hold these various 
participants liable would reflect their relative contributions to the 
infringement. But this is not what happens. Instead, courts focus in a 
highly formalistic way on physical performance of the relevant acts. The 
law is much tougher on those who execute the steps covered by the 
method patent—end users—than on those who design the device that 
enables the infringement—manufacturers. To win a case against 
Microsoft, Lucent had to prove that someone in the appropriate position 
at that company knew of the patent covering the Outlook appointment-
scheduling functionality and intended to infringe it.5 In contrast, to win 
against individual users of Outlook, Lucent would have to show only 
that they performed the claimed steps—in other words, the users are 
strictly liable.6 This is so despite the fact that it is Microsoft, and not 
the users, that operates in the relevant technology space. This is so even 
though Microsoft would be more readily expected than the users to find 
the patents at issue and to negotiate a license agreement with the 
patent owner. This is so, indeed, in spite of the recognition that the 
manufacturer in such cases is “truly responsible”7 for the infringement. 
In view of these considerations, the mens rea rules in this area seem to 
be completely backwards. 
Patent law struggles even more with the closely related set of 
cases in which performance of the claimed steps is divided between 
multiple parties, such as manufacturers and end users. The prolonged 
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. litigation is an 
example.8 Akamai asserted claims directed to a method of speeding up 
delivery of website content (for example, videos of game highlights by 
ESPN.com) by distributing the content to external servers.9 While the 
accused infringer, Limelight, actually distributed the content to the 
various servers and performed other steps in the process, the website 
owners designated, or “tagged,” the content so that Limelight would 
know which videos to send to the external servers.10 Although the 
 
 5.  Id. at 1320–24. 
 6.  See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 7.  Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 228 (2005); 
see also Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
1575, 1591 (2011). 
 8.  For the latest opinions, see Akamai Technologies, Inc. v Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), remanded to Akamai VI, 805 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1661 (2016). 
 9.  Akamai V, 797 F.3d at 1023–24. 
 10.  Id. 
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website owners are Limelight’s customers, and tagged the content 
according to its instructions, courts initially agreed with Limelight that 
it could not be liable as a matter of law because it did not perform all of 
the claim’s steps.11 
Courts have issued six appellate opinions in Akamai, including 
one by the Supreme Court12 and five by the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the court charged with exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over patent cases. But in spite of all this judicial effort, controversy over 
divided infringement is unlikely to die down. This is because the en 
banc Federal Circuit’s recent opinion that aimed to lay down the law in 
this area is problematic. The court relied on the tort law principle of 
vicarious liability to impute the customers’ content-designating actions 
to Limelight,13 reversing its earlier position that imputation could lie 
only if the user was the defendant’s agent or was contractually obligated 
to perform the steps.14 In the same breath, however, the Federal Circuit 
admitted that “vicarious liability is not a perfect analog.”15 That is an 
understatement: the section of the Restatement (Third) of Torts invoked 
by the court, which deals with vicarious liability, explains that this form 
of “liability is imputed based on the tortious acts of another.”16 Because 
there was no allegation in Akamai that the customers engaged in 
tortious conduct, the relevance of vicarious liability principles to this 
so-called “divided infringement” problem is uncertain.17 The Federal 
Circuit, which reached this result unanimously, clearly believed that it 
seemed wrong to let Limelight off the hook on the facts of the case—and 
in finding liability, responded to numerous critiques of the now-
 
 11.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), 629 F.3d 1311, 1311–14 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 12.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118–20 
(2014), rev’g Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301. 
 13.  Akamai V, 797 F.3d at 1022. 
 14.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai IV), 786 F.3d 899 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), rev’d en banc, Akamai V, 797 F.3d 1020. To be sure, the court mentioned vicarious liability 
in its first significant divided infringement case, but the conception of vicarious liability appears 
to have changed over time. See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (“[T]he law imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another in circumstances 
showing that the liable party controlled the conduct of the acting party.”); cf. Muniauction, Inc. v. 
Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“That [the defendant] controls access to its 
system and instructs bidders on its use is not sufficient to incur liability for direct infringement.”).  
 15.  Akamai V, 797 F.3d at 1022 n.2. 
 16.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). But 
cf. ROBERT STEVENS, TORTS AND RIGHTS 244, 254, 259–67 (2007) (discussing the action-attribution 
theory of vicarious liability in the employer-employee context).  
 17.  There are more fundamental reasons why the Federal Circuit’s vicarious liability 
approach is questionable in these circumstances. See infra Section I.D for further discussion. 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
570 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:565 
abandoned agency-or-contract regime.18 But the court’s new test for 
determining whether “all steps of a claimed method are performed by 
or attributable to a single entity” is unsatisfying.19 The vicarious 
liability fix is problematic as a matter of basic tort doctrine, provides 
limited guidance for future cases, and might fail to fit a large number 
of divided infringement scenarios in which liability might be 
warranted.20 
I explain that courts struggle with multi-party infringement 
because patent law formalistically clings to what I term the 
“performer/non-performer distinction.” Consider again the case 
involving Microsoft Outlook. The computer user who operates Outlook 
to schedule appointments, thus performing the steps covered by a 
patented method, is considered a “direct infringer.”21 In contrast, 
Microsoft, which designed the software but did not operate it (i.e., did 
not perform the method), is charged as an “indirect infringer”22—a form 
of liability akin to aiding and abetting. Based on these formal 
classifications, proving Microsoft’s liability presents significant mens 
rea hurdles, requiring the plaintiff to show that Microsoft knew of the 
asserted patent, and more.23 In contrast, regular computer users are—
oddly enough—subject to strict liability.24 And where, as in Akamai, 
there are two different performers (or, more precisely, the manufacturer 
is both a performer and a non-performer because it carries out only 
some of the claim’s steps), it has been difficult for courts to develop a 
stable rule of any sort. The Federal Circuit first held that Limelight 
could not be liable at all,25 and then—even though it granted a petition 
for rehearing en banc on the issue of direct infringement26—the court 
 
 18.  Akamai IV, 786 F.3d at 917–18 (Moore, J., dissenting) (collecting criticisms and further 
explaining why the decision to adopt the agency-or-contract limitation on imputing users’ acts to 
the manufacturer was misguided). 
 19.  Akamai V, 797 F.3d at 1022. 
 20.  The Federal Circuit recently decided a case dealing with divided infringement in the 
doctor-patient context. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2017). For an article explaining why the Akamai rule is an uneasy fit for this case, see Rachel E. 
Sachs, Divided Infringement and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 6 IP THEORY (forthcoming 2017), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2777639 [https://perma.cc/AP3B-6J88]; see also infra notes 449–456 and 
accompanying text. 
 21.  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317–20 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 22.  Id. at 1308–09, 1320–24. 
 23.  See infra Section I.C. 
 24.  See supra note 6. 
 25.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai I), 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), rev’d en banc, Akamai II, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 26.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 419 F. App’x 989, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(order) (per curiam) (“The parties are requested to file new briefs addressing the following issue: 
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decided to call Limelight an indirect infringer.27 Then, after a Supreme 
Court reversal28 and a panel opinion finding no liability,29 the Federal 
Circuit reversed itself once again and found Limelight liable as a direct 
infringer “on the facts of this case.”30 
There is a better approach for dealing with multi-party 
infringement. I argue that cases like Lucent and Akamai can be 
resolved in a sensible and intellectually satisfying way by reading the 
infringement section of the Patent Act in view of the principle of causal 
responsibility, which pervades the law31 and rests on a firm 
philosophical foundation.32 Simply put, this principle holds that one is 
responsible for the actions of others that one has caused, leading to the 
legal effect of imputing the act of the “causee” (in patent cases, often the 
end user) to the causer (e.g., the manufacturer). The effect of causal 
responsibility was captured by Professor Paul Robinson, who explained 
that “[a]n actor who does not personally satisfy an objective element, 
such as conduct, but who directly causes the required element by other 
means should be treated as if he satisfied the element himself.”33 
Crucially for the purposes of this Article, cases sometimes arise 
when courts will “decline to distinguish human from non-human causal 
links”34—in other words, when the “means” by which the defendant 
causes an element of an offense is another human being. For example, 
§ 158 of the Restatement of Torts states that “[o]ne is subject to liability 
to another for trespass . . . if he intentionally . . . enters land in the 
possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so,”35 
thus equating a “person” with a “thing.” These insights suggest that the 
line between “direct” and “indirect” violators does not always depend on 
who physically performs an act, for one can be a direct violator by acting 
through the instrumentality of another person.36 A paradigmatic 
 
If separate entities each perform separate steps of a method claim, under what circumstances 
would that claim be directly infringed and to what extent would each of the parties be liable?”). 
 27.  Akamai II, 692 F.3d at 1319. 
 28.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 
(2014). 
 29.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai IV), 786 F.3d 899, 915 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015). 
 30.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 31.  See infra Part IV. 
 32.  See infra Part III. 
 33.  Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609, 631 (1984). 
 34.  Id. at 632. 
 35.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF TORTS § 158(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
 36.  A student author proposed an “instrumentality standard” in an unpublished manuscript, 
but without theorizing the basis for this approach. See David Leach, Closing the Divided 
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example in which another person’s actions are imputed to the defendant 
under the principle of causal responsibility occurs when that person 
acts under the defendant’s compulsion.37 But, as I demonstrate, the 
application of this principle is not limited to facts involving duress.38 
The linchpin of causal responsibility is not so much control of another 
person, but control over the circumstances in which that person 
performs some act.39 
The formal performer/non-performer distinction, whereby the 
performer gets placed into the direct violator box and the non-
performer, into the indirect violator box, breaks down in situations 
where causal responsibility applies. And if the premise that a human 
intermediary in some cases is used like a tool is accepted, then logically, 
no indirect or vicarious liability theories, nor scienter in addition to the 
mental state for the underlying offense, should be required.40 We do not, 
 
Infringement Gap at 17 (Jan. 1, 2012) (unpublished student paper, Seton Hall University Law 
School) (on file with Seton Hall University Law School at http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student 
_scholarship/120 [https://perma.cc/7UA6-JDHJ]); see also id. at *3 (“This approach would find an 
actor liable for using another as an instrumentality to complete the elements of a claim regardless 
of direction of control.”). Among arguments made to a court, the closest that comes to the causation 
theory proposed in this Article was probably developed by the appellant in Aristocrat Technologies 
Australia PTY Ltd. v. International Game Technology, 709 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Federal 
Circuit characterized the argument as suggesting that the defendant “causes the [user] to make a 
wager and activate a user interface” within the meaning of the asserted claim and quoted the 
appellant’s contention that “the [user’s] actions are the ‘natural, ordinary and reasonable 
consequences’ of [the defendant’s] conduct.” Id. at 1362–63 (quoting Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants 
Aristocrat Technologies Australia PTY Limited and Aristocrat Technologies, Inc. at 54–55, 
Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2010-
1426), 2010 WL 4600163, at *54–55). Based on the authority mentioned in the brief, however, one 
gleans that the appellant relied upon a theory of proximate causation rather than on the notion of 
causing the acts of others. Causation theories have been raised in other divided infringement 
cases, but without much detail or discussion of what it means to cause act of others. See, e.g., Brief 
of Amici Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc. and Genomic Health, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 20, 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (No. 12-786), 
2014 WL 1478062, at *20 (“Whenever a first party performing one or more steps of a method claim 
knowingly causes one or more other parties to perform the rest of the steps of the same method 
claim . . . equity requires that the first party . . . be found liable for patent infringement.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 96 Cal. Rptr. 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).  
 38.  See, e.g., Bailey v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 37, 40 (Va. 1985). See generally infra Part 
IV. 
 39.  Bailey, 329 S.E.2d at 40 (applying the innocent instrumentality doctrine even though the 
perpetrator did not “control the actors” in the confrontation leading to the victim’s death, but 
“orchestrated a scenario . . . whose finale was bound to include harmful consequences”); cf. Douglas 
Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 60 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) (arguing that criminal liability is predicated 
not on the act requirement, but on the control requirement). 
 40.  Cf. STEVENS, supra note 16, at 253 (“Where the tort alleged does not require a particular 
state of knowledge or dishonesty, it is not necessary to allege that the procurer knows that the 
actions carried out amount to a tort.”); see also Riley v. State, 60 P.3d 204, 220 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2002): 
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after all, impose extra scienter (or other) hurdles to convict a defendant 
who uses a hammer as opposed to bare hands to perform some nefarious 
deed.41 Indeed, in drawing upon examples in criminal law42 and tort 
law43 to explicate the principle of causal responsibility, I explain that 
the causal imputation route to liability is distinct from “derivative” 
liability theories, such as aiding and abetting or vicarious liability.44 
Moreover, I briefly note its possible instantiations in areas of 
intellectual property law other than patents.45 Throughout, I make 
clear that the principle logically applies to both intentional and non-
intentional offenses,46 a detail that is significant because patent 
infringement is a strict liability offense.47 
Within the confines of the text of 35 U.S.C. § 271, the section of 
the Patent Act governing infringement, applying the principle of causal 
responsibility would lead one to conclude that one can “use[ ]” a 
“patented invention” by causing another entity to perform one or more 
elements of the asserted patent claim.48 This interpretation is not 
inconsistent with dictionary definitions of “to use,” which include “to 
 
The standard interpretation of the phrase “intent to promote or facilitate the 
commission of the offense” is that it requires proof of the accomplice’s intent to promote 
or facilitate another person’s conduct that constitutes the actus reus of the offense. With 
regard to the results of that conduct, the government must prove that the accomplice 
had whatever culpable mental state is required for the underlying crime. 
(emphasis omitted). 
 41.  Cf. Hayes v. Town of Hyde Park, 27 N.E. 522, 523 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.) (“Human 
causes stand no differently from any others, merely as such.”). This principle can also be found in 
the Model Penal Code: “A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) 
acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an 
innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2)(a) 
(AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added). There are, to be sure, criminal 
cases that have departed from this principle. See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The 
Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1341, 1436–60 (2002). 
 42.  See infra Section III.B.1; see also Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A 
Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 328 (1985) (explaining the criminal 
law doctrine of innocent agency, which relies on the causal responsibility principle). 
 43.  See infra Sections III.B.2–III.B.3; see also PAUL S. DAVIES, ACCESSORY LIABILITY, 181–
82 (2015). 
 44.  See infra Section III.C. Under a derivative theory, the aider and abettor is responsible 
for the offense committed by the “principal.” 
 45.  See infra Section IV.D.  
 46.  Cf. Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the 
Constraints of Intent, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1385 (1998) (“Allowing accomplice liability for 
unintentional crimes does not . . . involve an extension of accomplice doctrine, but merely merits a 
refocusing of its intent requirements away from the results produced by the principal and toward 
the conduct producing the result.”). For a classic example of causal responsibility in a criminal 
negligence case (styled as accomplice liability, however), see State v. McVay, 132 A. 436 (R.I. 1926).  
 47.  See supra note 6. 
 48.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
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avail oneself of”49 or “derive service from.”50 Textually, therefore, 
“using” does not require physical performance of every step of the claim 
by the defendant. Based on this interpretation, I contend that causal 
responsibility can be deployed in patent law without amending § 271, 
or even reversing any Supreme Court precedent interpreting this 
section.51 Although this approach has not been explicitly adopted by 
courts in patent cases, causal imputation is a widely accepted, flexible, 
and trans-substantive doctrinal tool that courts have relied on time and 
again to deal with cases in which more than one party is involved in the 
invasion of a right, and there is no evidence that Congress sought to 
repudiate it or to recharacterize it as a form of aiding and abetting. 
The ubiquity of causal responsibility suggests that we should 
interpret the Patent Act with this principle in mind. As Professors 
William Baude and Stephen Sachs argued in a recent article, the 
common law can provide “substantive rules”52 for interpreting statutes 
using terms whose linguistic meaning is not self-defining. They 
contended that courts “take their cues from an existing legal system,” 
which include established common-law principles.53 With respect to 
causal responsibility’s place in the common law, it is worth noting that 
it applies with equal force in criminal law, which is principally 
concerned with personal accountability, and in tort law, which is more 
focused on efficiency and compensation.54 Because the causal 
responsibility principle thus reflects “a convergence between . . . 
efficiency and justice imperatives,”55 its footing as an established 
common-law rule is quite solid. In contrast, patent law’s endorsement 
of a rigid performer/non-performer distinction represents the sort of 
 
 49.  Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995). 
 50.  Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884). For further development of the statutory 
argument, see infra Section IV.B.2. 
 51.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 52.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 
1105, 1112 (2017); see also id. at 1099, 1104–07 (arguing that “unwritten law” is often the best 
source of interpretation of statutes that do not themselves give much guidance); cf. Kirtsaeng v. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (“When a statute covers an issue previously 
governed by the common law, we must presume that Congress intended to retain the substance of 
the common law” (alterations and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 
529, 534 (1993) (“In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to 
the question addressed by the common law.” (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 
618, 625 (1978))). 
 53.  Baude & Sachs, supra note 52, at 1129. 
 54.  See infra Section III.A. 
 55.  Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory of Priorities 
in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 152 (1991). 
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“patent-exceptional”56 and overly formal57 approaches that have been 
roundly criticized and increasingly rejected.58 At bottom, I provide a 
novel interpretation of § 271 that would lead to a principled theory of 
multi-party patent infringement liability. 
The proposed framework relies heavily on the concept of causing 
acts of others, and much of the Article is devoted to unpacking it and 
examining when causal responsibility may be appropriately deployed in 
patent cases. As I make clear, causation claims would fail when the 
device provided by the manufacturer has noninfringing uses,59 when 
the user is active rather than passive or innocent, and in many other 
circumstances where the non-performing (or partially performing) 
entity accused of infringement is not in control of the relevant acts. But 
I argue that accused infringers in many significant types of patent cases 
will not be able to defend themselves on any of these grounds, thus 
incurring liability in a broader range of circumstances than now. 
This result comports with commonsense notions of legal 
responsibility and with the intuition that, as between the manufacturer 
and a passive user, the former is in a much better position to deal with 
the infringement.60 In laying down the modern law of products liability, 
Justice Traynor reasoned that “there is greater reason to impose 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413 
(2016). An entire symposium entitled Intellectual Property Exceptionalism in Administrative Law 
took place last year. See James Donald Smith, Foreword, Patent Exceptionalism with Presidential 
Advice and Consent, 65 DUKE L.J. 1551 (2016).  
 57.  See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774 
(2003).  
 58.  The Supreme Court has signaled a move away from patent exceptionalism in other 
contexts. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (punitive damages); Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (deference to fact findings by trial judges); 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (exceptional case 
determinations); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (declaratory judgment 
standing); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctions and equity 
practice). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent 
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62 (2013). 
 59.  Providing an article having substantial noninfringing uses is more like traditional aiding 
and abetting. Accordingly, the mens rea hurdles that are presently in place in this context are 
consistent with the requirements needed to establish such liability in other areas of law. See infra 
Sections III.C and IV.B.2; infra note 136 and accompanying text; see also STEVENS, supra note 16, 
at 254 (discussing the difference between “procuring” and “facilitating” and the corresponding 
difference in the levels of mental state required to establish liability for these different types of 
activities). The distinction between causing and aiding and abetting in patent cases appears to be 
confused, which perhaps explains the difficulties with the current state of the law. Cf. Charles W. 
Adams, Indirect Infringement from a Tort Law Perspective, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 635, 639–43 (2008) 
(distinguishing inducement and aiding and abetting). 
 60.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also infra Section IV.B.1; cf. Keith N. 
Hylton, Information and Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Hand Test for 
Causation Cases, 7 J. TORT L. 35 (2015) (discussing economic functions of causation in tort law).  
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liability on the manufacturer” than on a party “who is but a conduit of 
a product that he is not himself able to test.”61 I explain that this 
approach implicitly relies on causal responsibility and reflects many of 
the same considerations that appear in patent law.62 For example, as 
between the manufacturer and the user and other parties in the stream 
of commerce, the manufacturer may often be the “cheapest cost avoider” 
(i.e., the entity that can help prevent the harm at lower cost) in both 
products liability law and in patent law.63 
Applying causal responsibility in patent law would lead to three 
important practical consequences. First, doing so would lower the mens 
rea barriers64 needed to establish the liability of manufacturers who 
supply passive end users with devices configured such that the devices’ 
intended use results in the infringement of some method patent.65 
Second, it would provide a path for resolving in a readily justifiable way 
the vexing problem of divided infringement exemplified by Akamai,66 or 
at least supply more content for utilizing the uncertain “vicarious 
liability” test.67 Third, the proposed approach may in some cases help 
 
 61.  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 443–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring). This language from a products liability case refers to retailers, though it applies 
equally to innocent users whose acts injure third parties, as discussed infra Section III.B.3. In 
many patent cases, the “conduit” of claim step performance is the passive user. Cf. Louis 
Robertson, Implied Warranties of Non-Infringement, 44 MICH. L. REV. 933, 936 (1946) (“Where the 
manufacturer is commonly selling a particular product, it is reasonable to assume that he has 
looked into the question of infringement of outstanding patents.”). 
 62.  See supra Section III.B.3. 
 63.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
135–48 (1970). 
 64.  I am referring here to the knowledge-of-the-patent requirement and the defense of good-
faith belief of noninfringement. See infra Section I.C; see also supra note 23 and accompanying 
text. 
 65.  See infra Section IV.B.1. To be clear, there is a kind of a mens rea inherent in the concept 
of causation—specific intent that the causee perform the acts in question. See Kadish, supra note 
42, at 396: 
Actions, like results, can be caused, but only by acts intended to cause them. [“]An 
element of intention (intending the other to act in a specified way) is essential if one 
person is to be said to ‘cause’ another to act but not when he is said to cause some event 
to happen. This is not an independent legal requirement of a certain state of mind in 
the accused person, but part of the meaning of ‘causing’ in the sense of providing a 
reason for the non-voluntary act of another[”]. 
(quoting H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 327–28 (1959) (alterations omitted) 
(internal block formatting omitted)); see also STEVENS, supra note 16, at 254 (“If actions are to be 
attributed to the defendant, it is necessary that he intended those acts to occur.”). 
 66.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); see 
infra Section IV.C. 
 67.  There is some common ground between the Federal Circuit’s test and the approach I 
develop in that neither requires fault. See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.  
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shift the burden of ensuring compliance with existing patents from end 
users to manufacturers, which is as it should be.68 
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
background on the relevant principles of patent law, discusses the 
history of patent infringement liability of parties who have not 
themselves performed infringing acts, and critiques the state of the law 
in this area. Part II sets forth theoretical underpinnings of the trans-
substantive concept of causing acts of others and distinguishes it from 
other causation concepts, such as but-for causation. Using examples 
from criminal law and tort law, Part III demonstrates how notions of 
causal responsibility work in practice. Part IV applies this framework 
to patent law, addressing the problems of both indirect and divided 
infringement. This Part also notes how courts deal with similar 
situations in other areas of intellectual property law. Part V considers 
and answers important objections and reinforces the conclusion that the 
proposed approach makes good policy sense. 
I. MULTI-PARTY PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
A. The Problem of Method Claims 
The Patent Act imposes infringement liability on “whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention.”69 In order to determine whether an invention is “patented” 
within the meaning of the Act, courts ask whether it is covered by one 
or more claims of the patents asserted in litigation.70 Patent claims are 
numbered sentences at the end of a patent, often long and oddly worded, 
that define the boundaries of the patentee’s rights. Generally, claims 
can refer to a physical object, such as an object or a system, or an 
activity, such as a process or a method.71 While claims directed to an 
object or a system recite the system’s structural elements—for example, 
“a table comprising a top and legs”—claims directed to a process or a 
method recite steps of the activity using gerunds.72 An example of the 
latter is “a method of using a door, comprising inserting a key into a 
 
 68.  See infra Part V; see also infra note 383 and accompanying text. 
 69.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  
 70.  AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (explaining that claims 
govern the patent infringement inquiry). 
 71.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 72.  Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and 
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 
118 (2011). 
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latch, turning the key, twisting the door handle, and applying pressure 
to the door.” 
When plaintiffs assert infringement against a manufacturer, 
system claims can form the basis for direct liability under § 271(a) 
based on the manufacturer’s making and selling of the object, such as a 
table or a door, that the claims cover.73 The situation, however, is more 
complicated with method claims because infringement does not arise 
until the claimed activity is performed, i.e., until someone “use[s]” the 
invention within the meaning of § 271(a). Concretely, the hypothetical 
claim to the door-opening method is not infringed until someone opens 
the door.74 And unless the manufacturer itself opens the door,75 the 
manufacturer’s liability—if any—can generally only be indirect, i.e., 
derivative upon the users’ infringements.76 This is because courts have, 
without explicitly saying so, interpreted “use[ ]” to mean something like 
“physically perform” in the method claim context—an interpretation 
that is far from inevitable.77 
To be sure, indirect infringement of system claims can also be 
asserted against manufacturers, sometimes leading to difficulties.78 
Nonetheless, it is method claims that typically give rise to the complex, 
controversial multi-party problems that one encounters in patent law 
today, and such claims underlie the many cases in which indirect 
infringement is asserted against the manufacturer.79 The indirect 
infringement theories can be pursued under § 271(b), which states that 
“[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as 
an infringer,”80 and § 271(c), which states in relevant part that 
[w]hoever offers to sell or sells within the United States . . . a material or apparatus for 
use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
 
 73.  Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 923 n.53 (discussing method and system claims). 
 74.  Id. Stated another way, the acts of making the door and selling it to a customer cannot 
give rise to liability until the door becomes operational. 
 75.  And even if the manufacturer does open the door and is thus itself subject to liability, 
the patent owner may wish to also hold the manufacturer liable for the acts of its customers so as 
to increase the damages base. Cf. Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 939–45 (discussing various 
approaches to indirect infringement damages). 
 76.  See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) 
(holding that the defendant may not be held liable for inducing infringement of a patent when no 
one has directly infringed the patent). 
 77.  See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 78.  Cf. infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s approach 
to system claim infringement cases involving multiple entities). 
 79.  Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 923–24. 
 80.  35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).  
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patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.81 
In addition, under the Federal Circuit’s approach, method 
claims present the particularly difficult “divided infringement” 
problems of the sort encountered in Akamai.82 Continuing with the door 
example, let us add a step of “installing the door into a doorway” to the 
claim and suppose that the manufacturer performs that step while the 
user performs the rest. In this case, the rule that no infringement can 
lie unless every step is performed by a “single entity” bars the plaintiff’s 
claim as matter of law unless the plaintiff can show that “an exception 
to this general rule” applies.83 
This approach can be contrasted with the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of the situation in which multiple entities are involved in the 
infringement of system claims. As the court put it in one case, the 
challenge is how to analyze such liability in a situation in which a single 
party does not “directly interact”84 with all of the components of a 
system. The court concluded that “to ‘use’ a system for purposes of 
infringement, a party must put the invention into service, i.e., control 
the system as a whole and obtain benefit from it.”85 The court 
maintained that “physical or direct control over each individual element 
of the system” is not required; “the ability to place the system as a whole 
into service” is enough for infringement.86 This solution appears to solve 
 
 81.  Id. § 271(c) (emphasis added). 
 82.  Cf. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), 692 F.3d 1301, 1305–06 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, Akamai III, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014): 
When claims are directed to a product or apparatus, direct infringement is always 
present, because the entity that installs the final part and thereby completes the 
claimed invention is a direct infringer. But in the case of method patents, parties that 
jointly practice a patented invention can often arrange to share performance of the 
claimed steps between them. 
See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005). 
 83.  Aristocrat Techs. Austl. PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Tech., 709 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). While Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam), abrogated the specific rule that Aristocrat relied on, 
Akamai V still referred to the “single entity” construct. Id. at 1022, 1023.  
 84.  Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 85.  Id. at 1284 (emphasis added) (citing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 86.  Id. Arguably, the Centillion court’s focus on “direct” (as opposed to indirect) interactions 
suggests a causation-type approach—though, interestingly enough, the user rather than the 
manufacturer ends up being the causer. Id. at 1286–87. But in concluding that the manufacturer 
cannot “use” the system within the meaning of the statute, the court relied upon a now-rejected 
rule requiring “an agency relationship or other contractual obligation” between the two parties. 
Id. at 1287–88. Under Centillion, the end user is the direct infringer and the manufacturer, 
indirect—a result that might change under vicarious liability or causal responsibility frameworks. 
See id. Centillion thus illustrates that causal responsibility issues can arise in the system claim 
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the “divided infringement” problem with respect to system claims 
because the end user, as the ultimate beneficiary of the system, ends up 
being the direct infringer. 
Professor Timothy Holbrook criticized the inconsistent 
treatment of the different claim types in divided and indirect 
infringement contexts, noting that “the distinction between infringing 
uses of process and system claims finds no textual support in the 
statute” and arguing that there must be “a consistent test between 
these two situations.”87 He also suggested, consonant with the bottom-
line result in this Article, that “a process claim can be infringed by a 
machine that has no substantial non-infringing use other than to 
perform the patented process.”88 I agree with Professor Holbrook’s 
critique and maintain that the causation approach deals with both the 
method-system claim disparity in divided infringement scenarios, and 
with the problem that only indirect infringement theories are available 
in cases in which “the apparatus [supplied by the defendant] basically 
has one purpose—to perform the method.”89 
B. A Brief History of Patent Infringement Liability  
of Non-performing Parties 
Liability of a party that has not itself performed an objective 
element of an offense is ubiquitous in civil and criminal law, and patent 
law is no exception. The origins, history, and purpose of such liability 
in patent law have been extensively recounted elsewhere,90 but some 
background will help set the stage for further discussion. Wallace v. 
Holmes was a significant early case imposing patent infringement 
liability on a party that can be characterized as a non-performer.91 This 
case dealt with a patent on an “improved lamp” having a chimney and 
 
context, but it seems that method claims give rise to multi-party infringement issues much more 
often than system claims. See id. 
 87.  Timothy R. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 32–33), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2760490 [https://perma.cc/3D95-2JLU] 
[hereinafter Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism]; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2152–53 (2008) (arguing that 
the Federal Circuit’s “differential application of § 271(a)’s provisions to method and system claims 
runs contrary to the clear language of the statute”). 
 88.  Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 35). 
 89.  Id. (manuscript at 36). 
 90.  See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (2006); see also Adams, supra note 59; Timothy 
R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 399 (2006); Lemley, supra note 7, at 235–36. 
 91.  29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); Adams, supra note 90, at 371–72 
(discussing Wallace).  
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a novel, specially designed burner that helped keep the bottom of the 
chimney cool.92 The defendant made and sold burners “in all material 
respects like that described in the patent,”93 but not the chimneys. 
The circuit court articulated several reasons why, even though 
the defendant’s product did not meet every element of the asserted 
patent claim, the defendant was nonetheless liable for infringement. 
The court explained that the defendant sold the burners “with the 
certain knowledge that such burners are to be used, as they could only 
be used, by the addition of a chimney,”94 which resulted in “assisting . . . 
in a gross infringement of the complainant’s patent” by those who 
bought the burner and combined it with the chimney.95 In addition, 
even though the defendant “did not make an actual prearrangement 
with any particular person to supply the chimney to be added to the 
burner,” the court noted that “every sale they make is a proposal for the 
purchaser to do this.”96 As a result, the court made a “certain inference” 
that the defendant acted “in actual concert” with others—unidentified 
chimney manufacturers97—and was therefore liable as a “joint 
infringer.”98 The court also voiced a practical concern: while a plaintiff 
could in theory go after the end users, this strategy could render the 
plaintiff “helpless and remediless” because of “the small value of each 
separate lamp, and the trouble and expense of prosecution.”99 
The language in Wallace might arguably be read either as 
setting forth an action for direct infringement where the two 
manufacturers (of the burner and the chimney) are acting as joint 
tortfeasors,100 or of derivative infringement based on the burner 
manufacturer’s assistance of a user’s infringement. Nonetheless, the 
case has been cited mainly for the latter proposition.101 There is now 
 
 92.  Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79.  
 93.  Id. (statement of the facts). 
 94.  Id. at 80. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id.:  
The defendants have not, perhaps, made an actual pre-arrangement with any 
particular person to supply the chimney to be added to the burner; but, every sale they 
make is a proposal to the purchaser to do this, and his purchase is a consent with the 
defendants that he will do it, or cause it to be done. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  The manufacturer of the chimney, though, might be relieved of liability because the 
chimney is a so-called “staple” article of commerce. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012); Adams, supra 
note 90, at 387. 
 101.  Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187–89 (1980); Adams, supra note 
90, at 372; see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897). 
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wide consensus that Wallace ushered in the doctrine of derivative, or 
“contributory,” infringement.102 
But neither Wallace nor the early cases that relied upon it used 
the word “contributory.” For example, in Bowker v. Dows, a circuit court 
noted that “the manufacture and sale of the extract of [a certain 
chemical] would not, without more, be an infringement,”103 but, citing 
Wallace, held liable a defendant who “sells an extract containing [that 
chemical] to persons who intend to use it in the combination claimed in 
the patent, and it is advertised and sold for that very purpose.”104 The 
Bowker court made no suggestion that the theory of infringement was 
derivative, and further opined that it would be unfair in some situations 
to impose liability only on performing parties while allowing non-
performers to go scot-free, underscoring the equitable rationale105 of 
non-performer infringement theories: 
We do not think that the law requires us to hold those persons who actually use the 
combination (most of them, and perhaps all, without any purpose or knowledge of 
infringing), as the only persons liable, to the exoneration of the only person who makes 
and sells the extract for the express and avowed purpose of its use in the combination.106 
Early Supreme Court cases also made no suggestion that the 
non-performer’s liability was to be styled as derivative. American 
Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, the first Supreme Court case to recognize 
patent infringement by a non-performer, cited Bowker and stated 
simply that “[b]ecause the defendants prepare and sell the arrow tie, 
composed of the buckle or link and the band, intending to have it used 
to bale cotton and to produce the results set forth in the [asserted] 
patents, they infringe those patents.”107 And Morgan Envelope Co. v. 
Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., another Supreme Court case, 
summarized the state of the law as follows: “There are doubtless many 
cases to the effect that the manufacture and sale of a single element of 
 
 102.  See Adams, supra note 90; Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent 
Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1953). 
 103.  3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C. Mass. 1878) (No. 1,734). 
 104.  Id. at 1071. 
 105.  Although these sorts of theories are not formally grounded in equity, indirect 
infringement has been described as an “equitable doctrine.” See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
Nabisco Brands, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1485, 1489 (D. Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l 
Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Hiram Walker & 
Sons v. Corning & Co., 255 F. 129, 131 (N.D. Ill. 1918) (discussing “the equitable doctrine of 
contributory infringement” in the trademark context).  
 106.  Bowker, 3 F. Cas. at 1071; see also Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 188 (“The court permitted 
the patentee to enforce his rights against the competitor who brought about the infringement, 
rather than requiring the patentee to undertake the almost insuperable task of finding and suing 
all the innocent purchasers who technically were responsible for completing the infringement.” 
(emphasis added)) (discussing Wallace).  
 107.  106 U.S. 89, 95 (1882).  
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a combination, with intent that it shall be united to the other elements, 
and so complete the combination, is an infringement.”108 The Court did 
not qualify the word “infringement” with any adjective connoting 
derivative liability.109 
The label “contributory infringement” was attached to non-
performer liability for the first time in a reported case in Snyder v. 
Bunnell, a circuit court opinion that issued a few years after Cotton-Tie 
(but before Morgan Envelope), and the term eventually caught on.110 
Crucially, the courts that used this label made clear that they viewed 
the relationship between direct and contributory infringers as that 
between “the principal and the accomplice,”111 thereby relying on a 
criminal-law construct that signifies derivative liability of the non-
performer.112 With the advent of the “contributory” label, some courts 
began to draw a sharp line between performers, who could be liable for 
direct infringement, and non-performers, who could be liable only for 
contributory infringement. One court of appeals decision, in attempting 
to determine whether defendants “are direct or contributory infringers,” 
concluded that “[t]o be direct infringers, the defendants must have used 
the plaintiff’s process,”113 assuming without analysis that actual 
physical use by the defendants themselves was the only way that direct 
infringement could lie.114 After determining that “defendants do not use 
the machine” that performs the process but “merely supply it for use”115 
by others, the court concluded that the defendants “are clearly not 
direct infringers of the plaintiff’s process patent.”116 Nonetheless, the 
defendants could be liable as contributory infringers because “they 
manufacture and sell materials for use in an infringing operation with 
 
 108.  152 U.S. 425, 433 (1894). 
 109.  Cf. H. Hume Mathews, Contributory Infringement and the Mercoid Case, 27 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 260, 264 (1945): 
The courts have realized that joint and several liability may be involved in the violation 
of a patent right as in the violation of other rights; they gave redress against one who 
contributed to an infringement by concerting with or aiding and abetting a direct 
infringer even before such a joint wrongdoer was named a “contributory infringer.” 
 110.  29 F. 47, 48 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).  
 111.  Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897).  
 112.  Interestingly, the trend in criminal law itself has been to eliminate distinctions between 
principals and accomplices. See infra notes 256–260 and accompanying text. 
 113.  B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 117 F.2d 829, 833 (1st Cir. 1941), aff’d, 314 U.S. 495 (1942). 
 114.  Cf. supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (noting that application of the causal 
responsibility principle to infringement under the Patent Act is not inconsistent with the 
dictionary definition of “to use”). 
 115.  B. B. Chem. Co., 117 F.2d at 833. 
 116.  Id. at 834. 
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knowledge that they will be so used” and “induce their customers to use 
such infringing processes.”117 
The increasing popularity of the word “contributory” has, 
apparently, led to a rigid conceptual separation between the forms of 
liability for performers and non-performers. But the law has in many 
circumstances recognized that one can carry out various acts through 
the instrumentality of another person, blurring the separation. This 
approach, in contrast to holding the non-performer responsible for the 
liability of the performer as the derivative route does, results instead in 
the imputation of a performer’s acts onto the non-performer. The 
Federal Circuit, in dealing with the situation in which the defendant’s 
customers performed only some of the claim’s steps, accomplished this 
latter result in Akamai under the guise of “vicarious liability” when it 
affirmed the jury verdict that Limelight was directly liable for the 
infringement.118 Given the uneasy fit of vicarious liability principles in 
these circumstances,119 however, the roots of the Federal Circuit’s 
approach might lie not in the vicarious liability doctrine, but in the 
principle of causal responsibility. And notably, nothing in the act-
imputation theory limits the principle to a scenario where the 
performer carries only some, as opposed to all, acts that constitute the 
actus reus of an offense, making it potentially applicable in both 
“divided” and “indirect” infringement cases.120 
Congress, in the Patent Act of 1952, codified patent infringement 
in § 271 and, in particular, set forth acts (“make,” “use,” “sell”) that 
constitute infringement under § 271(a). But what about § 271(b) and 
(c)? The House Judiciary Committee Report characterized these 
subsections as formalizing the judicially recognized doctrine of 
contributory infringement, which “has been applied to enjoin those who 
sought to cause infringement by supplying someone else with the means 
and directions for infringing a patent.”121 It explained that part (b) 
“recites in broad terms that one who aids and abets an infringement is 
likewise an infringer” and that part (c) concerns the specific 
circumstance of sale of a component that the Report elsewhere calls “a 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1025 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam).  
 119.  See infra Sections I.C–I.D.  
 120.  For example, consider the crime of burglary, for which the actus reus consists of breaking 
and entering. It is difficult to imagine a different result in the case in which the defendant caused 
both the breaking and the entering by another as opposed to, say, the case in which the defendant 
performed the breaking and caused the entering.  
 121.  H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2402 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2402. 
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special device constituting the heart of a patented machine.”122 
Although the Report thus appears to assume that non-performer 
liability has been considered derivative upon the infringement liability 
of the user, Wallace, Bowker, and the early Supreme Court cases show 
that this characterization is not inevitable.123 
The Report does provide very strong evidence that Congress 
thought that derivative liability constitutes the primary route for 
holding those who do not themselves perform patent claim steps 
responsible for patent infringement, and my goal here is not to write a 
revisionist history of § 271. Nonetheless, case law does suggest that 
non-performer or partial-performer infringement was not always 
subsumed under the “indirect” label, but was instead based on general 
common-law principles of attribution.124 And these principles must 
continue to remain relevant even without explicit codification. Indeed, 
while the Patent Act does not mention the respondeat superior doctrine, 
it would be a tall order to argue that it does not apply in patent cases—
and even the staunchest supporters of rigorously enforcing the “single 
entity” rule in divided infringement cases125 do not deny the 
applicability of actual agency to patent law.126 The debate in Akamai 
was not about the validity of relying on agency, vicarious liability, and 
related principles, but only about how far those principles extend.127 
 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  In addition, the Report mentions causing infringement, id., a reference that might 
endorse causation-based imputation theories. See infra note 494 and accompanying text. 
 124.  Indeed, there is suggestion in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act that causal 
responsibility principles were explicitly contemplated by the relevant stakeholders. See, e.g., 
Contributory Infringement in Patents, Definition of Invention: Hearings on H.R. 5988, H.R. 4061, 
and H.R. 5248 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-Marks, and Copyrights of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 3 (1948) (“The doctrine of contributory infringement is nothing more 
than the application to the patent law of the general legal principle that one who causes a wrong is 
as guilty as one who actually does the wrong with his own hands.” (quoting Memorandum from the 
New York Patent Law Association on H.R. 5998) (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court relied on 
this memorandum in interpreting a related issue involving § 271 in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 205 (1980). 
 125.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 126.  See, e.g., Response to Plaintiff-Appellee’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En 
Banc at 6, Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 2007-1485), 
2008 WL 3992445, at *6 (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Agency to argue that act 
attribution is proper where the defendant “controls the conduct of the acting party” (citations and 
alterations omitted)); cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 52, at 1088, 1110 (discussing the maxim that 
statutes in derogation of the common law are narrowly construed). 
 127.  Compare Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“That [the defendant] controls access to its system and instructs bidders on its use is not sufficient 
to incur liability for direct infringement.”), with Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. 
(Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (“[L]iability 
under § 271(a) can also be found when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
586 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:565 
Like vicarious liability or actual agency, causal imputation 
embodies a well-established common-law principle of attribution that, 
in the absence of a clear congressional statement to the contrary, 
continues to apply.128 Moreover, reading the Patent Act in view of this 
principle would make eminent sense as a policy matter. In contrast, as 
the remainder of this Part explains, current approaches can lead to 
unsatisfying outcomes, such as making manufacturers more difficult to 
hold liable than their customers and generally creating barriers to 
enforcement of method claims that have led, in Professor Holbrook’s 
words, to a questionable regime of “method patent exceptionalism.”129 
C. Indirect Infringement and Its Discontents 
Courts and commentators generally agree that “[t]he goal of 
secondary liability is to give patent owners effective protection in 
circumstances in which the actual infringer either is not the truly 
responsible party or is impractical to sue.”130 But the difficulty of 
establishing this form of liability can prevent patentees from 
vindicating their rights even in cases in which it seems intuitively clear 
that the non-performer is truly responsible for the infringement.131 To 
be sure, there are good reasons for making non-performer liability 
difficult to establish.132 An expansive conception of such infringement 
might ensnare legitimate and socially valuable commercial activities, 
from providing internet search engines133 to supplying general-purpose 
 
or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes 
the manner or timing of that performance.”). 
 128.  See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 
1429–33 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing this principle in the context of respondeat superior and agency 
principles generally); cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 52, at 1104–07 (arguing that “unwritten law” 
is often the best source of interpretation for ambiguous statutes). 
 129.  Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87. 
 130.  Lemley, supra note 7, at 228; see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 
176, 221 (1980): 
[T]he policy of stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent system runs . . . 
deep. And the doctrine of contributory infringement, which has been called “an 
expression both of law and morals,” can be of crucial importance in ensuring that the 
endeavors and investments of the inventor do not go unrewarded. 
(citation omitted). 
 131.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 132.  Lemley, supra note 7, at 228 (“[T]he law must take equal care to avoid imposing liability 
on those who participate in the stream of lawful commerce merely because their products can be 
misused.”); Rantanen, supra note 7, at 1591 (“[I]ndirect infringement’s ability to deter must be 
balanced against the possibility of over-imposing liability on those who participate in commerce.”). 
 133.  See Mark Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines: The Questionable Role of 
Criminal Law in Contributory Infringement Doctrine, 2009 BYU L. REV. 783, 784 [hereinafter 
Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines]; see also Mark Bartholomew, Contributory 
Infringers and Good Samaritans, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 19 (2009). 
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tools like computers to those who end up using them to infringe.134 A 
court more than a hundred years ago remarked: “In a sense, a trespass 
is aided if the trespasser is fed during the trespass. Yet it can hardly be 
contended that an infringer’s cook is liable as a contributory 
infringer.”135 The law, reasonably so, makes it difficult to impose 
liability on a general service provider or a supplier of a device having 
multiple uses136 without any showing that this type of a defendant 
intends to profit specifically from the activity covered by an intellectual 
property right.137 
Patent law takes these commands quite seriously—and perhaps, 
to forgive an expression, to a fault. Consider the level of proof needed to 
establish active inducement of patent infringement under § 271(b), a 
subsection that says simply that “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” The word 
“induce” has been interpreted to require, at the very least, specific 
intent to cause acts that happen to result in the infringement.138 In 
addition, though, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew of 
the patent covering the accused product, or was willfully blind to its 
existence, in every case in which liability is grounded under this 
subsection.139 This is a very significant hurdle because “numerous 
potential infringers do not have actual knowledge of the patent at the 
time of suit.”140 What is more, even in cases in which the defendant is 
 
 134.  Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87. 
 135.  Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202–03 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898) (cited in 
Lemley, supra note 7, at 236). 
 136.  For patent law examples, see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 
911 F.2d 670, 673–75 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (analyzing infringement issues involving a medical device 
that is capable of performing both a patented method and a method in the public domain); and 
Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1269–73 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (analyzing 
infringement issues involving the Rubik’s Cube puzzle).  
 137.  But cf. Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark 
Infringement, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10 (discussing expansion of indirect liability in trademark 
law); Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in 
Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 513 (2009) (making similar conclusions for copyright 
law).  
 138.  See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant 
part). As noted earlier, this aspect of the “mens rea” requirement is correct based on general 
causation principles. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. In addition, it was clearly 
contemplated by the drafters of the statute. See Rich, supra note 102, at 537. 
 139.  Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760 (2011); Aro Mfg. Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964). For a contrary approach, see Lemley, 
supra note 7. 
 140.  Ted Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 307, 
310 (2013) [hereinafter Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism]; see also Ted Sichelman, Minding 
Patent Infringement (San Diego Leg. Stud. Paper No. 11-051, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1734380 [https://perma.cc/GW3D-VAFX]. In these articles, Professor Sichelman 
maintained that Aro and Global-Tech were wrongly decided because there is no support of the 
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aware of the patent that is ultimately found to be directly infringed, 
courts allow a defense of good-faith belief of noninfringement.141 
Although patentees can obtain prospective relief once an infringement 
case is finally adjudicated in their favor,142 courts’ approach to fault in 
these cases significantly limits the patentees’ ability to collect past 
damages for method claim infringement.143 
In practice, these rules appear to elevate the defendant’s mental 
state with respect to the underlying patent beyond mere knowledge, or 
even “purposeful intent,” to a level that is extremely rare in other areas 
of law.144 For example, the tort of battery generally does not require 
proof of intent to violate the law or to cause harm—well-intentioned but 
unwanted touching is still a battery.145 And even in criminal law, which 
pays greater heed to moral culpability than tort law or patent law146 
and thus focuses more sharply on subjective intent,147 the level of mens 
 
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act. Although I 
share Sichelman’s doubts, and particularly question the good-faith belief outgrowth of this rule, 
see infra notes 145–151 and accompanying text, I ultimately take the Supreme Court case law as 
a given and maintain instead that the mens rea rules simply do not apply in the causation 
scenarios. See infra note 429 and accompanying text. For other criticisms of “scienter” standards 
for indirect infringement, see Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” 
Under Patent Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225 (2006); 
Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit 
Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299 
(2001). For a defense, see Holbrook, supra note 90. 
 141.  Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926–28 (2015); Warsaw 
Orthopedic, Inc. v. NuVasive, Inc., 824 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 142.  Cf. Holbrook, supra note 90, at 405–07 (discussing intent standards in indirect 
infringement cases). 
 143.  Cf. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 21) 
(criticizing “courts’ exceptional and inconsistent treatment of method claims”). Somewhat 
anomalously, under a recent Supreme Court decision, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, 
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016), it may well be easier to obtain punitive damages for egregious 
or willful patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 than to prove indirect infringement. Cf. 
Rader, supra note 140, at 331–32 (arguing that willfulness should carry with it a higher level of 
culpability than indirect infringement). But see Rantanen, supra note 7, at 1632–33 (arguing that 
indirect infringement and willfulness should be subject to the same standard). 
 144.  See infra notes 386–389 and accompanying text; see also Weiss, supra note 41 at 1393–
96; cf. id. at 1453–56, 1473–77 (discussing origins and applications of the “bad purpose” approach 
to intent in criminal law). 
 145.  See, e.g., Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding 
“horseplay” to constitute battery); White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 111 (Idaho 1990) (finding 
the “touching method” of a piano teacher to constitute battery); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 
(Minn. 1905) (holding that unlawful intent need not be shown in a civil action for battery); Vosburg 
v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891); see also Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 391, 396 (1975). But cf. Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion 
and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585 (2012) (noting confusion in the case law on these points). 
 146.  See generally Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 147.  See Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 533 (2000).  
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rea one sees for inducement under § 271(b) is rarely, if ever, present.148 
All of these requirements are, moreover, in severe tension with the 
fundamental principles that mistake or ignorance as to the extent of 
another person’s rights (e.g., in the law of trespass),149 or mistake or 
ignorance as to the controlling law (e.g., in criminal law), does not 
relieve one from liability.150 And in tort cases in particular, “[I]t is a 
fallacy—call it the ‘moralistic fallacy’—to suppose that the essence of 
wrongdoing is a strong form of culpability or blameworthiness.”151 
Nevertheless, patent law goes out of its way to protect manufacturers 
in method patent cases, and all of this stems from the fact that they are 
non-performers. There is no consideration of the broader context of the 
infringement.152 
As suggested by “the infringer’s cook” example,153 elevated 
mental state requirements for establishing non-performer infringement 
may sometimes be warranted.154 To give a more realistic set of facts, 
where the technology accused of facilitating infringement has different 
kinds of uses, some of which are infringing and others not,155 it may 
stand to reason to require knowledge of a specific intellectual property 
right underlying the infringing branch of the technology’s application, 
and perhaps even scienter. But as we will see, this is not what is 
happening in many patent cases. Unlike cooks, providers of internet 
search engines, or makers of computers, many manufacturers accused 
of indirect patent infringement are not providers of a general service or 
 
 148.  Direct analogies between crimes and violations of patent rights are questionable in any 
event, see, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 7; and Sherkow, supra note 146, and it seems intuitive that 
culpability standards for crimes should be higher than for patent infringement. High levels of 
subjective culpability reflect society’s moral condemnation, and therefore make more sense for 
criminal law than for patent law. In contrast, objective evaluations of conduct, as opposed to 
subjective mental states, might fit better with the utilitarian grounding of patent law. See 
generally Dmitry Karshtedt, The Modern Pirate: Toward a New Standard for Enhanced Damages 
in Patent Law (manuscript in preparation). I further address the relevance of criminal law to 
patent law infra Section III.A. 
 149.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). But cf. Bailey v. S.J. 
Groves & Sons Co., 230 S.E. 2d 267, 269–70 (W. Va. 1976) (repudiating the strict liability approach 
in trespass law). The bottom line, however, is that whatever mental state hurdles the law of 
trespass imposes, it does not seem to distinguish between actual trespassers and causers of 
trespass. See infra Section III.B.2; cf. infra note 302 and accompanying text (noting that liability 
under the causation provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) is not derivative). 
 150.  See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987). 
 151.  John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 501 (2015); see also 
Cane, supra note 147, at 533.  
 152.  See infra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. 
 153.  See supra notes 132–137 and accompanying text. 
 154.  Cf. infra notes 390–391 (noting that similar rules in criminal law are designed to protect 
marginal participants in an offense). 
 155.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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platform. Instead, they supply specific software features, medical 
devices, or drugs that can be used only to infringe particular method 
patents—rather than facilitating generalized “piracy” mixed in with 
noninfringing uses of the service or product.156 In such cases, the end 
user has no choice but to perform patented steps when it would like to 
get any value out of the product that it bought, or out of a particular 
feature of a product.157 
The law, however, does not distinguish between these two types 
of scenarios at all. A claim against a manufacturer of a medical device 
that, when deployed by a customer, executes the steps of a patented 
method in its only mode of operation is subject to exactly the same 
scienter requirements as a claim against a cook accused of aiding and 
abetting a violation of patent rights by making food for the infringer—
or against the maker of a device capable of performing patented 
methods as well as those in the public domain.158 It is clear why we 
should try to shield the latter two defendants from liability; the first, 
not as much. 
Anticipating an objection that I further address in Part V, one 
might argue that the present scienter elements are justified because 
supplying a medical device (or Outlook software) to customers is also a 
run-of-the-mill commercial activity that has only been made “illegal” by 
the happenstance that the steps those products execute are covered by 
a patent.159 But this argument proves too much. First, there are 
numerous activities in life that might not seem wrong based on 
everyday notions of moral culpability but that are nonetheless illegal or 
tortious because the law makes them so, often without any requirement 
of fault.160 In patent law in particular, we have decided to make 
infringement strict liability,161 but the current approach undermines 
this rule by bringing fault through the backdoor and in contravention 
 
 156.  See infra Section IV.D; cf. STEVENS, supra note 16, at 254 (discussing the need for 
stringent mens rea requirements in copyright law, where “machines could be used for both lawful 
and unlawful purposes”). 
 157.  See infra Sections IV.B–IV.C. 
 158.  See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 674 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 159.  But cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent 
Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1026–30 (2016) (arguing that a rule that allowed for 
a good-faith belief of invalidity as a defense to indirect infringement encouraged challenges of bad 
patents). 
 160.  See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282–84 (1943); supra note 145 and 
accompanying text. 
 161.  For an argument why this rule is sensible, see Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for 
Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016). 
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to common-law principles.162 Whether or not some manufacturers, 
particularly those that develop the invention independently as opposed 
to copying the subject matter of the patent, should be shielded from 
patent infringement liability is a debate well worth having.163 But the 
performer/non-performer distinction, on its own, provides a highly 
dubious basis for protecting manufacturers as a doctrinal matter. 
The second difficulty, closely related to the first, is that direct 
patent infringement does not require any proof of culpable intent.164 
Utilizing medical devices that one has bought and paid for, exactly as 
intended by the manufacturer, is also not at odds with anyone’s 
conceptions of morality, but an end user can be held liable for doing so, 
even without the knowledge of the underlying patent. The related 
argument that many patents are ultimately held not infringed (or 
invalid) likewise does not account for the way in which direct infringers 
are treated.165 As long as the patent remains valid at the end of the 
litigation, the directly infringing end user will be liable; good-faith 
belief in noninfringement is no defense to direct infringement.166 In 
sum: under the current approach, the manufacturer of a device that can 
only be utilized so as to infringe can avail itself of numerous mens rea 
defenses, but the customer using that device as intended is strictly 
liable. 
How did we get to this backwards result?167 Again, the formal 
reason is that the customer performs the method claim steps and 
therefore falls into the direct infringer category, while the 
manufacturer does not perform the steps and ends up as an indirect 
infringer. The difference hinges only on who performs the steps and 
does not take into account which of the two parties designed the device. 
This approach reminds one of the much-maligned, and long-rejected, 
“last human wrongdoer” rule of proximate causation, which used to 
command that only the entity that directly interacted with the plaintiff 
 
 162.  See infra Part III. 
 163.  See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 478–79 (2006). But see Merges, supra note 161. 
 164.  See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated 
on other grounds by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 165.  See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 159. The Federal Circuit actually did make a good-faith 
belief in invalidity a defense in Commil, but the Supreme Court reversed this holding. Commil 
USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015). 
 166.  There are often practical impediments in the way of suing direct infringers. I focus, 
however, on the legal requirements of liability. 
 167.  Cf. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (arguing that courts should 
treat method claims the same way as the other claim formats). 
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could be liable in tort.168 More remarkably, as noted above, patent law 
would apparently not distinguish between a manufacturer who supplies 
the infringing device169 from “the infringer’s cook.”170 As non-
performers, they are equal in the eyes of the law. 
These counterintuitive outcomes occur because courts treat 
infringement of method claims in a highly formalistic fashion. Because 
the manufacturer is a non-performer, courts place it into the indirect 
infringement box, and that categorization in turn triggers the 
requirement of scienter. While the remainder of this Part completes the 
discussion of problems with courts’ treatment of infringement in cases 
in which the defendant performs fewer than all steps of the asserted 
patent claim, Parts III and IV show that the law is actually not so 
inflexible. 
D. “Divided Infringement” and Its Discontents 
So-called “divided infringement” is another problematic area of 
patent law. As outlined in the Introduction, this label refers to the 
phenomenon of method claims that cannot be infringed because no 
single entity performs all of the claim’s steps.171 An example using 
simple technology, based on Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., will 
help illustrate the problem.172 The plaintiff owned a patent to a method 
for locating available real estate property using a zoom-enabled map on 
a computer. The patent included a claim directed to  
[a] method [of] using a computer for locating available real estate properties comprising 
the steps of: 
(a) creating a database of the available real estate properties; 
(b) displaying a map of a desired geographic area; 
(c) selecting a first area having boundaries within the geographic area; 
(d) zooming in on the first area of the displayed map . . . ; 
(e) displaying the first zoomed area; 
 
 168.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 277 (5th 
ed. 1984); cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1894) 
(suggesting that the last human wrongdoer may not be the only cause of injury). 
 169.  The discussion assumes a theory of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Subsection 
271(c), which might also be applicable on these facts, presents the same mens rea obstacles as 
§ 271(b), but applies specifically to sellers of so called “nonstaple” articles “especially made or 
especially adapted for use in an infringement.” See Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 
U.S. 754, 764–65 (2011). 
 170.  See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 171.  As the rest of this Section explains, there are exceptions to this so-called “single entity” 
rule in the method claim context. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 172.  709 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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(f) selecting a second area having boundaries within the first zoomed area; 
(g) displaying the second area . . . ; and 
(h) identifying available real estate properties within the database which are located 
within the second area.173 
The defendant operated an interactive website, using data from 
a database it created (step (a)), that allowed users to search for 
available properties.174 The landing page provided a search box in which 
a user could type in the state and county of interest. Once this was 
done—for example, the user typed in “California – Los Angeles 
County”—the website displayed the county map, thus performing step 
(b). The website then invited the user to “click on the map or the links 
below to search for . . . real estate in California”; the links would include 
parts of Los Angeles County, such as “San Fernando Valley” or “Los 
Angeles – Westside to Downtown.” After the user performed step (c) by 
clicking on the map or the links, the website zoomed into and displayed 
this smaller area—steps (d) and (e)—and the process repeated itself. In 
other words, the website asked the user to “click on the map or the links 
below” to pick an area within a previously chosen area, such as “Beverly 
Hills” or “West Hollywood” within “Los Angeles – Westside to 
Downtown.” After the user did so, at step (f), the website displayed the 
smaller area and identified available properties within it (steps (g) and 
(h)). To sum up, all of the claim’s steps were performed, but by two 
separate entities—the accused infringer, who operated the website’s 
host computer, and the website’s user, who performed the “selecting” 
steps (c) and (f).175 
On these facts, the Federal Circuit held in 2013 that there was 
no infringement by the website’s operator as a matter of law because it 
did not “exercise direction or control over users of its websites.”176 Under 
this approach, plaintiffs like Move, Inc., could essentially never prove 
infringement. Many commentators have strongly criticized this rule 
because it rendered a large number of patents on interactive methods 
wholly without value, arguing that it created a loophole in patent law 
 
 173.  Id. at 1119–20 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,032,928, claim 1 (filed Apr. 
24, 1989)).  
 174.  See Brief for Defendant/Counterclaim-Appellant Real Estate Alliance Ltd. at 16, 20, 
Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 709 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1342), 2010 WL 
2968764, at *16, *20. 
 175.  See Move, 709 F.3d at 1122. 
 176.  Id. at 1122–23. Until August of 2015, the only ways in which the direction or control test 
could be satisfied were “a principal-agent relationship, a contractual relationship or in 
circumstances in which parties work together in a joint enterprise functioning as a form of mutual 
agency.” Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai IV), 786 F.3d 899, 905 (Fed. 
Cir.), rev’d en banc, Akamai V, 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see also supra note 14 
and accompanying text. 
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and attacking it on economic, policy, and fairness grounds.177 The 
contrary view is that divided infringement problems are often of the 
patentees’ own making and can be fixed with careful claim drafting,178 
and that it would be unfair to impose liability where the defendant did 
not “instruct[ ] the other [entity] to perform the infringing steps.”179 But 
in spite of the importance of the problem and perhaps because of “the 
competing policy concerns” identified by commentators, “courts 
have . . . formulated a series of ever-changing, conflicting standards in 
hopes of equitably resolving these cases under the Patent Act.”180 In 
2014, the Supreme Court entered the debate and strongly hinted that 
the rule exemplified by cases like Move was wrong, noting “the 
possibility that the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly 
circumscribing the scope of § 271(a).”181 
The Federal Circuit’s recent en banc Akamai decision, 
presumably responding to these critiques and taking the Supreme 
Court’s hint, unanimously changed the applicable standard.182 While 
the test previously in force allowed attribution of claim step 
performance from users to manufacturers based only on agency or 
contractual relationships, the court relaxed it with its new take on 
vicarious liability.183 Now, an accused infringer can also be held liable 
when it “conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit 
upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and 
establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”184 In Akamai 
itself, the Federal Circuit held that both prongs of this test were met 
 
 177.  See, e.g., Damon Gupta, Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection 
Under the Single Entity Rule, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61, 62 (2012); W. Keith Robinson, 
No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 59 
(2012); Stacie L. Greskowiak, Note, Joint Infringement after BMC: The Demise of Process Patents, 
41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 354 (2010); see also Akamai IV, 786 F.3d at 917–18 (Moore, J., dissenting) 
(collecting criticisms). See generally W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided Infringement 
and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961 (2015) (providing economic justifications 
for the robust enforcement of patents in some divided infringement scenarios).  
 178.  See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 82, at 271–74. 
 179.  Id. at 259; see also id. at 261. 
 180.  Nathaniel Grow, Resolving the Divided Patent Infringement Dilemma, 50 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1, 22 (2016). 
 181.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 
(2014). 
 182.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). Unanimous en banc decisions have been fairly rare at the Federal 
Circuit in recent years, and this decision’s unanimity perhaps confirms the view that the previous 
rule was simply untenable because it was too defendant-friendly. 
 183.  Id. at 1023. 
 184.  Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 
(2005)). The court also adopted an additional theory of attribution based on joint-enterprise 
principles. Id.  
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because Limelight, the defendant, was actively involved in its 
customers’ execution of claim steps that it did not perform.185 For 
example, Limelight required its customers to sign a standard form 
contract delineating their responsibilities for making sure the service 
worked and had its engineers “continuously engage with customers’ 
activities.”186 Time will tell whether the more arms-length relationship 
between the customer and the accused infringer in cases like Move 
would also be sufficient to impose liability. 
Whatever one thinks of the bottom-line result of Akamai’s latest 
installment, it is difficult to argue that vicarious liability is the right 
route to attribution on the facts of many divided infringement cases. 
First, vicarious liability—like the doctrines of indirect and contributory 
infringement—is a liability-shifting doctrine,187 but the customer or 
user did not perform a tortious act in Akamai or Move.188 Second, it 
must be remembered that employer liability for tortious acts of its 
employees committed in the scope of employment is the paradigmatic 
application of vicarious liability.189 But a customer or user is not an 
employee, and even when vicarious liability is not predicated on an 
employer-employee relationship, its hallmark is the defendant’s “right 
and ability to supervise” another party.190 This doctrine, therefore, 
simply does not fit the manufacturer-customer scenarios discussed 
here, for one generally has no right or ability to supervise one’s 
customers. 
To be fair, Akamai’s “manner or timing” language harkens back 
to copyright and trademark cases in which vicarious liability was found 
when defendant dance halls provided physical space to direct 
infringers191 and perhaps cases in which direct infringers operated 
under license from the defendants.192 But these opinions already 
pushed the outer limits of vicarious liability, and even then the quasi-
 
 185.  Id. at 1024. 
 186.  Id. at 1025. 
 187.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 188.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 213–14 (4th ed. 
2012) (explaining that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “employers are vicariously liable 
even absent their own negligence, for torts committed by their employees ‘within the scope of 
employment’ ”). 
 190.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005); 
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green 
Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306–08 (2d Cir. 1963).  
 191.  Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307–08 (discussing the dance hall cases). For a particularly broad 
conception of “premises,” see A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 192.  See, e.g., Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306. 
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supervisory relationships they involved were much different from the 
standard manufacturer-customer relationship.193 In discussing Shapiro 
Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., a leading copyright vicarious liability 
case, one brief recently explained that “the defendant exerted a high 
level of control over the concessionaire, including ‘unreviewable 
discretion’ to terminate the concessionaire’s employees.”194 The brief 
concluded that “[t]he Shapiro fact pattern thus bore a strong 
resemblance to the paradigmatic respondeat superior relationship—
that of employer and employee.”195 Such a relationship does not appear 
to be present in Akamai. 
Thus, leaving aside the problem that there is no liability to be 
shifted in divided infringement cases, the vicarious liability doctrine 
does not readily apply to the facts of such cases. Two paths forward are 
then possible. One is that Akamai is a sui generis case involving the 
rare manufacturer-customer relationship that does give rise to 
vicarious liability, and cases like Move will continue to result in no 
infringement as a matter of law. This result would perpetuate a 
questionable noninfringement loophole for patents on interactive 
technologies, even in cases in which a defendant specifically instructs 
users to perform particular claim steps in order for the users to get 
value out of the defendant’s product, as when Real Estate Alliance 
invited users to “click on the map.”196 Two, it may be that Akamai 
applies broadly, but the Federal Circuit’s conception of vicarious 
liability would then be so different from that doctrine’s roots that the 
label would cease to be meaningful. The second result, too, would be 
questionable because, while Congress in 1952 likely meant for the 
doctrine of vicarious liability to apply to patent infringement actions,197 
 
 193.  See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023–24; cf. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 
654–55 (7th Cir. 2003) (expressing “doubts” that vicarious liability should be imposed on similar 
facts and noting that vicarious liability “has been extended in the copyright area to cases in which 
the only effective relief is obtainable from someone who bears a relation to the direct infringers that 
is analogous to the relation of a principal to an agent” (emphasis added)). 
 194.  Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees 
at 21, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-55500), 2016 WL 
859639, at *21 (quoting Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  With respect to the drafting side of the criticism, see supra note 178 and accompanying 
text. Move, Inc.’s claims can probably be redrafted from the point of view of a single entity. For 
example, instead of “selecting” at steps (c) and (f), the claim might recite “receiving a selection.” 
Still, it is not clear that the claim as drafted provides significantly less notice to the defendant 
relative to this hypothetical claim, or would be somehow unfair to enforce against the defendant. 
The defendant, after all, has created a website with a zoom-enabled map designed for users in 
search of a real estate to click on and invites users to select the areas of interest. See infra notes 
440–442 and accompanying text. 
 197.  In the sense that Congress “intends” for background common law to continue to apply 
unless it specifies otherwise. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 52. 
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it could not have plausibly intended for courts to create a doctrine of 
attribution that deviates so significantly from its common-law roots.198 
E. The Commonality Between Non-performer  
and Partial Performer Scenarios 
Indirect infringement cases like Lucent and divided 
infringement cases like Akamai are not very different. It is telling, for 
example, that the Federal Circuit’s 2012 attempt to pin liability on 
Limelight was based on an inducement theory under § 271(b), and that 
the court achieved the same result under § 271(a) by 2015—while the 
facts obviously have not changed.199 This back-and-forth dynamic 
reflects a struggle with the rigid line courts have sometimes drawn 
between performer and non-performer infringement. The facts of 
Akamai, a case that involved partial performance, push on that line, 
and the supposedly clear distinction between direct and indirect 
liability based on who performs method claim steps becomes even more 
blurred. 
But courts are overthinking the problem. As I further explain in 
Part IV, Akamai and Lucent exemplify very similar issues. In both types 
of cases, a manufacturer or a service provider supplies a tool that causes 
customers to perform some (in Akamai) or all (in Lucent) steps of a 
particular method patent, and there is no reason for two entirely 
different rules to deal with them. Here’s an abstracted illustration of 
the problem. Suppose that a claim that two separate defendants (D1 
and D2) are accused of infringing has ten steps. Suppose also that, in 
both cases these defendants supply a device whose only intended use 
results in the performance of all ten steps. In the first case, D1 performs 
none of the steps, but conditions receipt of a benefit by customer C1 on 
performance of all ten and establishes the manner or timing of the 
performance. In the second case, D2 performs one of the steps and 
conditions receipt of a benefit by customer C2 on performance of the 
remaining nine and, as in case one, establishes the manner or timing of 
the performance.200 It would seem odd to limit the available theories of 
liability to § 271(b) in the first case, but to allow for § 271(a) liability in 
 
 198.  A third way to treat the Federal Circuit’s use of “vicarious liability” is as a label for 
another doctrine of attribution accepted at common law—such as the doctrine of causal 
responsibility. If this is the right path, then the rest of this Article will serve to provide content for 
deploying this attribution approach.  
 199.  See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.  
 200.  See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1022 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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the second case.201 In both cases, by hypothesis, the defendants provided 
a device whose only intended use results in the performance of one or 
more steps of the claim, and both D1 and D2 have acted in such a way 
as to have “performed” all of the steps either in actuality or by legal 
fiction. 
Pursuing this reasoning, creative litigants could characterize 
certain cases in which users have performed all of the claim’s steps as 
giving rise to vicarious liability under the latest installment of 
Akamai.202 But long-term viability of this strategy is unclear because 
vicarious liability has historically been a form of indirect, or derivative, 
infringement in intellectual property cases and elsewhere in the law.203 
One might then reasonably argue that widespread utilization of 
“vicarious liability” in this manner might impermissibly render § 271(b) 
and (c), the statutory indirect infringement provisions, superfluous.204 
If this argument is accepted, however, we will have the strange result 
that vicarious liability (as deployed by the Federal Circuit) applies only 
in cases in which it defies traditional tort doctrine—when the customer 
has not engaged in tortious conduct.205 
The goal of the remainder of the Article is to cut these Gordian 
knots. Under causal responsibility, certain cases that currently fall into 
indirect or divided infringement categories because of non-performance 
or partial performance of claim steps by the defendant might instead be 
treated the same way, and without dubious requirements of scienter or 
overextension of principles of vicarious liability.206 Part IV explains how 
this approach would work in patent law and demonstrates its 
consistency with the Patent Act. Parts III and IV, which follow, set forth 
 
 201.  See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 202.  This is already happening. See, e.g., Corrected Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Adaptix, Inc. at 9–11, Adaptix, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2015-1441 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2015), 2015 
WL 7693423, at *9–11. This appeal was dismissed as moot after oral argument. See Adaptix, Inc. 
v. Apple Inc., No. 2015-1441 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2016), ECF No. 114. 
 203.  See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 802–06 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(copyright and trademark example). Unlike inducement and contributory infringement, vicarious 
liability in patent law is not codified. 
 204.  Similar arguments were made in the now-vacated Akamai panel opinion on remand from 
the Supreme Court. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai IV), 786 F.3d 
899, 906–08 (Fed. Cir.), rev’d en banc, Akamai V, 797 F.3d 1020. I contend that the proposed 
causation approach is less immune to the attack that it renders § 271(b) and (c) superfluous. See 
infra Section IV.B.2. 
 205.  In § 271(b) and (c) cases, by hypothesis, the end user has engaged in tortious conduct 
because proof or underlying direct infringement is required for indirect liability. See ACCO 
Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining that proof 
of indirect infringement necessarily requires proof of instances of direct infringement). 
 206.  Under the Patent Act, liability on this theory could be formally grounded in § 271(a), (b), 
or (c). I explain how this would work infra notes 413–426 and accompanying text.  
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the causal responsibility principle and show how it works outside of 
patent law. 
II. THE CONCEPTS OF CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY AND  
OF CAUSING ACTS OF OTHERS 
A. Selected Causation Concepts 
Causation concepts in law can be complex, multifarious, and 
enigmatic. They are also trans-substantive—causation appears in 
criminal law, tort law, and contract law, among other areas. Causation 
problems in specific areas of law, as well as across legal disciplines, 
have drawn significant attention from philosophers, legal scholars, and 
courts. To advance the claims in this Article, this Part focuses on how 
causation concepts have been applied to multi-party problems.207 Some 
general background on causation, nonetheless, is helpful to set the 
stage for further discussion. 
Two familiar causation concepts in tort and criminal law are but-
for cause and proximate cause. But-for causation relates to the notion 
that, if it were not for something that the defendant did, the harmful 
outcome or event at issue would not have occurred.208 Proximate 
causation, in contrast, is a mechanism for limiting liability for harms 
that are, in some way, too remote or unforeseeable given the nature of 
a defendant’s acts.209 Both concepts have particular salience for multi-
party problems. For example, if a defendant gave words of 
encouragement to a person who was in any case determined to commit 
a particular crime, how should the but-for causation analysis proceed, 
and what is its relevance to the defendant’s liability?210 Or, if the 
defendant negligently provided liquor to a person who killed someone 
in an alcohol-induced rage, could the defendant’s liability be cut off on 
proximate cause principles even though but-for causation seems 
clear?211 
 
 207.  For another proposal for use of causation concepts to analyze liability for non-performers 
in intellectual property cases, see Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines, supra note 
133, at 827–40.  
 208.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 168, § 41, at 265–68. 
 209.  Id. §§ 42–44, 272–319. 
 210.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 15 So. 722, 732–41 (Ala. 1894) (finding that 
defendant aided and abetted the murderers even though defendant’s actions did “not contribute to 
the criminal result in the sense that but for it the result would not have ensued”); see also infra 
Section III.C. 
 211.  See, e.g., Phan Son Van v. Peña, 990 S.W.2d 751, 752–53, 755 (Tex. 1999). In this case, 
the defendant’s behavior fell below the applicable standard of care and was therefore negligent, 
but he escaped liability on proximate cause grounds.  
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But-for and proximate cause do not exhaust the universe of 
causal principles in law. Another cluster of important issues, 
particularly pertinent to multi-party problems, relates to the concept 
that Professor Michael Moore described as “scalar” causation.212 This 
term refers to the idea that when an event or an outcome has multiple 
human causes, the causal contribution from each individual agent 
might be small or big—which, in turn, influences the analysis of the 
agent’s liability.213 In tort law, this concept is reflected in the principle 
of causal apportionment of liability between multiple tortfeasors.214 
And, as we will see, the innocent agency doctrine in criminal law might 
also be viewed through the lens of smaller and bigger causes.215 One 
important application of scalar causation theory is that a defendant can 
be a major causal contributor without physically performing the act 
that directly brings about the harm. Professor Moore explained: 
[O]ne who picks the victim of the murder, orders a subordinate to do it, pays him well for 
it, locates the victim for the hit-man, brings the gun and ammunition, and drives the hit-
 
 212.  MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND 
METAPHYSICS 275 (2009).  
 213.  Id. at 299–314. The very idea that causes can have various degrees or “potencies” has 
been questioned. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible 
Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1146 (1988): 
Some condition either was or was not a cause (in the proper scientific sense) of a 
particular injury. There is no way, based purely on causation, to identify one cause of 
an injury as more important or significant than any other cause of the same injury. . . . 
True “causal apportionment” is conceptually meaningless.  
For a judicial expression of doubt of comparative causation, see Sandford v. Chevrolet Division of 
General Motors, 642 P.2d 624, 629–31 (Or. 1982). For a recent critical analysis, see James 
Goudkamp & Lewis Klar, Apportionment of Damages for Contributory Negligence: The Causal 
Potency Criterion, 53 ALBERTA L. REV. 849 (2016); see also Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal 
Comparisons, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 913 (1992). In any event, the concept of causing the acts of 
others is directed to a closely related yet distinct concern. See infra Section II.B. 
 214.  Critiques listed in the previous footnote aside, “comparative causation” has a firm 
foothold in tort law, and particularly in products liability cases. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks 
Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159–61 (3d Cir. 1979) (Rosenn, J.). See generally MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 370–72 (9th ed. 2011). For a theoretical 
treatment, see Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An 
Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980). Although I do not propose causal apportionment 
of damages for patent infringement among multiple defendants, at least one article does suggest 
this possibility. See Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97 
(2011). But see John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer’s Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of Patent 
Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 
278, 279 (2008) (arguing that the Patent Act “does not mandate, or even allow, proration of 
royalties among contributory and direct infringers” and further concluding that “[t]he idea of 
proration of royalties is . . . antithetical to the statute”). Finally, Judge Newman proposed an 
apportionment approach to divided infringement in her dissent in one of the Akamai opinions. 
Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai II), 692 F.3d 1301, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting), rev’d, Akamai III, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 215.  See infra Section III.B. 
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man to the location of the killing, substantially causes the death of the victim. We should 
thus say plainly that one way to be an accomplice is by causing the harm through the 
action of another. Substantially aiding another to cause some harm is to substantially 
cause the harm oneself, whatever the pretensions of the intervening causation fiction.216 
Two takeaways become apparent from this analysis. The first is 
the converse of the conclusion that the mastermind in Professor Moore’s 
scenario is “the substantial causer.”217 The hit-man, though he or she 
engages in the acts that physically bring about the victim’s death, could 
conversely be viewed as a minor cause of the crime relative to the 
mastermind. This notion might on the surface seem shocking—how can 
a killer be anything but the leading cause of the victim’s death? Upon 
further reflection, however, this conclusion might not seem so strange. 
If the mastermind is committed to having a target killed, he or she could 
find some other hit-man even if the first few candidates refuse. The 
causal driver of the killing is the person who makes up his or her mind 
to have a victim killed, not the fungible contract executioner. 
The second takeaway is that, even though a human being—the 
hit-man—is interposed between the mastermind and the victim, the 
chain of causation between the mastermind’s acts and the victim’s 
death is not cut off. In the language of torts, the hit-man’s volitional act 
of shooting the victim is not a “superseding cause” that relieves the 
mastermind of responsibility.218 The mastermind’s actions are both but-
for and proximate causes of the victim’s death, and, significantly, the 
mastermind’s causal contribution is substantial. The bottom line is that 
physically performing an act constituting an element of an offense is 
not always the determinative factor when it comes to causal 
responsibility. 
B. Causing Acts of Others 
Professor Moore’s analysis also raises an important question 
that is closely related to, but different from, the ideas underlying scalar 
causation and of substantially causing harm through the 
instrumentality of another. The question is whether one can intelligibly 
speak of causing acts of other individuals. Specifically, can we say that 
the mastermind in Professor Moore’s hypothetical caused the hit-man 
to kill the victim? This phrasing is problematic because the hit-man is, 
after all, a human being, and it seems awkward to contend that a 
defendant causes another person to do something—say, to shoot the 
 
 216.  MOORE, supra note 212, at 301 (emphasis omitted). 
 217.  Id. (arguing that in these circumstances it would make sense to treat the mastermind as 
“a principal in his own right,” just as in cases in which “there is no guilty principal”). 
 218.  See, e.g., Doe v. Manheimer, 563 A.2d 699 (Conn. 1989). 
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victim—in the same way that one might cause a door to open by 
pushing. This discomfort has led to a great deal of philosophical inquiry 
into what, if anything, it would take to conclude that a person’s act has 
been caused—particularly, if the act is voluntary. The overwhelming 
consensus is that a voluntary act can be caused. The law reflects and 
builds on this intuition by using this form of causation as a route to 
imputing acts of causee-performers to causer-non-performers, thus 
holding the latter legally accountable for those acts as if they were the 
non-performers’ own.219 
I begin with the classic account of causation in the law by 
Professors H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré.220 These authors set forth the 
seemingly blanket proposition that “a free and deliberate human action 
is never regarded as itself caused.”221 They maintained that “[a] 
deliberate human act is . . . often something through which we do not 
trace the cause of a later event” and argue that the language of “cause” 
is more appropriate for effects of human action on inanimate objects 
rather than on other human beings.222 Professors Hart and Honoré 
contended that, for interpersonal transactions, “the concept of reasons 
for action” is more suitable than the concept of “causes of events.”223 And 
yet even these authors, who appear to be less comfortable than most 
with the concept of cause in human interactions, conceded that “[m]any 
important causal idioms are appropriate for the description both of . . . 
relationships between human actions and ordinary causal 
sequences.”224 They identified four inquiries that are relevant for 
answering the question whether another person did something as a 
result of (i.e., caused by), the first person’s words or actions: 
(i) in all of them the second actor knows of and understands the significance of what the 
first actor has said or done; (ii) the first actor’s words or deeds are at least a part of the 
second actor’s reasons for acting; (iii) the second actor forms the intention to do the act in 
question only after the first actor’s intervention; (iv) [the first actor] intends the second 
actor to do the act in question.225 
Although Professors Hart and Honoré did not say outright that 
these criteria, if met, would justify the conclusion that a person has 
caused an act of another—perhaps because of their general aversion to 
 
 219.  See infra Part III. 
 220.  H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985). 
 221.  See JOEL FEINBERG, Causing Voluntary Actions, in DOING AND DESERVING 152, 152 
(1970) (alterations omitted) (quoting H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law, 72 L.Q. 
REV. 80 (1956)). 
 222.  HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220, at 44. 
 223.  Id. at 51 (emphasis omitted). 
 224.  Id. at 52. 
 225.  Id. at 53. 
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using causal language to describe interpersonal interactions—they 
come close. They concluded that the chain of causation can at least be 
“traced through” from the non-performer to the effects of the 
performer’s act in cases in which the level of the non-performer’s 
involvement in the performer’s act is high, i.e., when it meets all of these 
four criteria.226 Building on the work of Hart and Honoré, Professor Joel 
Feinberg contended that it was indeed coherent to speak of causing 
another’s acts and, significantly, noted that there is “compatibility of 
voluntariness with causal determination.”227 He argued that “the more 
expectable human behavior is [in response to an action we call a cause], 
whether voluntary or not, the less likely it is to ‘negative causal 
connection.’ ”228 
Other scholars are even more sanguine to the notion that a 
person can cause acts of another, resulting in the legal consequence of 
imputation of the causee’s acts to the causer.229 Although Professor 
Sanford Kadish made clear that he was uncomfortable with the legal 
fiction that the acts of the causee are actually the acts of the causer, 
unless the former is truly an automaton or a puppet of some sort, he 
nonetheless concluded that voluntary acts can be caused. He argued 
that “[i]t is quite natural to conceive of the secondary actor as causing 
the actions of the primary actor” in circumstances where the causee’s 
“conduct may be thought of as the product of the secondary actor’s 
manipulation.”230 Combining the framework developed by Professors 
Hart and Honoré with Professor Kadish’s intuitions, one concludes 
there can be a strong causal link between the doings of two actors when 
the second action is intended and orchestrated by the original actor and 
follows the first regularly and predictably.231 
Professor David Lanham’s approach is similar—he contended 
that “there is a point at which an instigator becomes a principal 
offender and may be held liable for causing the actus reus of the offence 
even though the immediate actor is another person.”232 In agreement is 
Professor Robinson, who argued: 
 
 226.  Id. at 63; see also id. at 57–58.  
 227.  FEINBERG, supra note 221, at 186. 
 228.  Id. at 166 
 229.  See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 689 (1930) (discussing the ways in which a principal may be held liable for the acts of an 
agent). 
 230.  Kadish, supra note 42, at 370, 371. 
 231.  HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220, at 19–20, 111–18. 
 232.  David Lanham, Accomplices, Principals and Causation, 12 MELB. U. L. REV. 490, 491 
(1980). 
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[I]n cases where the causal link is strong, it is natural to think that the actor actually did 
satisfy the element [of a crime] himself . . . [The] spectrum of cases along which the 
strength of the causal relation varies with the actor’s degree of control over the other 
person or, in other words, with the other person’s degree of independent action.233 
Finally, Professor Keith Smith concluded that “[t]he stronger the 
accessory’s causal role and the weaker the perpetrator’s, the greater 
should be the inclination to label the actions as ‘principal’ through 
innocent agency.”234 Somewhere along the continuum of causality, the 
indirect violator becomes a direct violator, and another person’s acts 
become the causer’s acts by operation of law.235 
Crucially for the purposes of this Article, intent to violate the 
law (or to invade someone’s right, or to cause harm) is analytically not 
required for a court to conclude that a defendant caused an act of 
another.236 Of course, the state or the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant possessed the underlying mens rea required by the 
substantive offense, whatever it might be.237 Moreover, as the work of 
Professor Kadish, of Professors Hart and Honoré, and of others shows, 
inherent in the very idea of causing acts of others is the causer’s intent 
that the causee carry out those specific acts.238 Finally, as the discussion 
of the case examples will demonstrate, there will be other facts required 
to show that the defendant is sufficiently in control of the situation to 
be labeled a causer—perhaps, provision of a tool that enables the causee 
to perform the act, some information asymmetry between the two 
parties, passivity of the causee, and so on.239 The barrier to prove that 
 
 233.  Robinson, supra note 33, at 631, 632. 
 234.  K.J.M. SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 118 (1991). 
 235.  This is to be contrasted with imputation of liability (as opposed to acts) under derivative 
theories.  
 236.  This becomes particularly evident when the underlying offense lacks the requirement of 
intent. Cf. PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 32 n.6 (1997) (explaining that secondary 
liability requires knowledge of facts which make the conduct tortious, but not appreciation of the 
fact that the conduct was tortious); STEVENS, supra note 16, at 253 (“Where the tort alleged does 
not require a particular state of knowledge or dishonesty, it is not necessary to allege that the 
procurer knows that the actions carried out amount to a tort.”); Kadish, supra note 42, at 347 & 
n.48, 349, 399 (noting that a defendant may be liable for intending to help a primary actor engage 
in an act that turns out to be reckless or negligent, and explaining in particular that “the intention 
requirement [for accomplice liability] is independent of the mens rea requirement for the 
underlying crime”); Lanham, supra note 232, at 509–12 (similar); see also Lenzi v Miller [1965] 
SASR 1, 3 (Austl.) (“[T]he usual statutory direction to do or not to do certain things at peril is 
aimed more directly at the ‘accessory’ in control of the activity than at the ‘principal’ whose hand 
does the forbidden act.”). Note that intent to violate the law is generally not required to establish 
liability for intentional torts such as battery, either. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 237.  See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 238.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. For a particularly sophisticated treatment of 
causal explanations for human actions, see generally DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND 
EVENTS (2d ed. 2001). 
 239.  See infra Part III. 
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a defendant has caused an act of another is high. But if the underlying 
offense is strict liability, no showing of a causer’s intent to violate the 
law or to invade someone’s right is necessary, for such a requirement 
would contravene the defining characteristic of strict liability.240 
According to Professor Lanham, this result is “a perfectly tenable 
application of the strict liability principle.”241 He reasoned that there is 
“no reason why strict liability should not be imposed on the real causer 
of the harm.”242 The causer cannot complain of an unfair burden beyond 
that which the strict liability nature of the offense already imposes 
because there is substantial certainty that the acts he or she seeks to 
have the causee carry out will occur just as intended.243 
III. CAUSAL IMPUTATION IN CRIMINAL LAW AND TORT LAW 
A. General Considerations 
In this Part, I discuss the application of the principle of causal 
responsibility in three distinct areas of law—criminal law, the law of 
trespass, and products liability. These fields have distinct justifications, 
purposes, and conceptual foundations. Broadly speaking, criminal law 
is concerned mainly with moral responsibility,244 while “the dominant 
function” of tort law (to which products liability and trespass belong) is 
“the prevention of rights-violations and the repairing of harm by the 
award of remedies.”245 Moreover, as between trespass and products 
liability, there are significant conceptual differences. Trespass is a 
model of conduct responsibility,246 while products liability involves 
outcome responsibility;247 to establish the former, the violation of a right 
 
 240.  See supra note 236 and accompanying text. To be sure, courts in criminal cases have 
made rulings that depart from this framework. For an explanation why this departure is not 
coherent, see Weiss, supra note 41, at 1479–81 (contending that the preferred approach, which is 
rooted in causation, “generally avoids anomalous, unfair distinctions between the principal and 
the accomplice,” including in strict liability cases); see also id. at 1388–89 (discussing the 
applications of the arguably anomalous “purposeful intent” approach to accomplice liability in 
strict liability offenses). 
 241.  Lanham, supra note 232, at 512.  
 242.  Id. at 515. 
 243.  Cf. Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND JUSTICE 1512, 1516–18 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing a “timeframe” approach to 
strict liability that shows that even in a strict liability case, the defendant might in some way be 
“at fault”). 
 244.  See Cane, supra note 147, at 552, 555. 
 245.  Id. at 555. 
 246.  See CANE, supra note 236, at 51–52 (noting that trespass is based on responsibility for 
conduct).  
 247.  TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT, 12–15, 23–32, 76–81 (1999). 
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is sufficient and actual harm need not be proved,248 while the latter 
requires the existence of an actual injury.249 But all three make use of 
causal responsibility in some form, explicitly or implicitly. These 
observations should give us a sense of the pervasiveness of this 
principle in the common law and thus its significance and value as a 
substantive tool of interpretation. 
Although it does appear in tort law, causal responsibility has 
found the clearest application in the criminal law doctrine of innocent 
instrumentality, also referred to as “innocent agency.”250 As discussed 
in the Introduction, this doctrine applies when a defendant causes a 
person to perform an act—or, more formally, when a defendant 
performs an act through the instrumentality of another.251 For example, 
if D asks T, a third party, to give a drink to victim V that, unknown to 
T (but known to D) is poisoned, D is liable for murder if V dies from the 
poison under this doctrine.252 
It is important to distinguish this route to liability from the 
“indirect” (or “derivative,” or “secondary”) approach. D’s liability cannot 
be derived from T’s because T is innocent, and is therefore not 
convictable of murder.253 Moreover, as a matter of common sense, this 
situation could not be fairly described as an instance of aiding and 
abetting. Even though T delivers the drink, it is D who is in control of 
the situation, and D has caused T to perform the actus reus of murder. 
D, in other words, is not “assisting” T, but using T as an instrument.254 
Reliance on such examples, however, leads to the antecedent question 
whether criminal cases are even relevant for understanding patent 
law.255 I believe that they are. 
First, like criminal law, patent law today draws heavily on the 
distinction between direct and indirect liability, which suggests that 
criminal law is a useful template for analyzing concepts that might also 
inhere in patent law—and, indeed, to understand situations where the 
direct-indirect framework breaks down. In this vein, it is worth noting 
that even in criminal cases many courts have stopped fixating on the 
 
 248.  Id. at 105 n.31. 
 249.  See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976). 
 250.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 251.  See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 252.  Kadish, supra note 42, at 370. 
 253.  Id. at 327–28. 
 254.  Id. at 370–71; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text; cf. STEVENS, supra note 16, 
at 254 (discussing the difference between “procuring” and “facilitating”).  
 255.  Cf. Sherkow, supra note 146 (criticizing the importation of various criminal law concepts 
into patent law). 
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old common-law labels “accomplice” and “principal,”256 a trend that has 
been playing itself out in ways that might be contrasted with analogous 
scenarios in patent law. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, 
ruled that “a verdict may be sustained upon evidence that the defendant 
participated . . . as an aider and abettor, even though he was not 
expressly accused of aiding and abetting and even though he was the 
only person charged in the information.”257 In so doing, the court 
underscored the “emptiness of any distinction between principal and 
accomplice liability.”258 Nonetheless, the terms “accomplice” and 
“principal” are still routinely mentioned in criminal cases, and the 
distinction remains significant.259 And these terms have historically 
been used in patent cases.260 
In contrast, the very notion of “indirect” liability in tort law is 
quite underdeveloped, and, with occasional exceptions, multi-party 
problems are treated under joint tortfeasance principles.261 As 
discussed above, many pre-1952 patent cases followed the tort 
approach, eschewing a rigid distinction between direct (performer) and 
contributory (non-performer) infringement.262 But for some reason—
and even though § 271(b) in the Patent Act, in particular, does not use 
any adjectives to modify the word “infringer”263—modern patent law 
continues to cling to the direct-derivative distinction. All this suggests 
that criminal law, though concerned with social goals that are very 
different from those of patent law or tort law, is a good analytical model 
for illuminating issues of multi-party liability that arise in patent cases. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court in Akamai appeared to decline 
the plaintiff’s invitation to consider the relevance of criminal law to the 
problem of divided infringement. In particular, it rejected an analogy 
 
 256.  See generally Weiss, supra note 41, at 1355–62. 
 257.  State v. McDonald, 981 P.2d 443, 448 (Wash. 1999) (citations omitted). The same is true 
in federal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72 (6th Cir. 1966) (“[I]t has long 
been held that an indictment need not specifically charge ‘aiding and abetting’ or ‘causing’ the 
commission of an offense against the United States, in order to support a jury verdict based upon 
a finding of either.”). In contrast, courts in patent cases are very particular about whether a direct 
or indirect theory of infringement is being pursued. See Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., 
Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117–20 (2014) (rejecting liability under a theory of indirect 
infringement but suggesting that the infringement could be re-pled as direct). 
 258.  McDonald, 981 P.2d at 448. 
 259.  See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246, 1249–50 (2014).  
 260.  See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.  
 261.  See Mark Bartholomew & Patrick F. McArdle, Causing Infringement, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
675, 694–98 (2011); cf. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999) (discussing 
torts that involve the facilitation of the conduct of others, which do not receive a “secondary” or 
indirect label). 
 262.  See supra Section I.A. 
 263.  See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 133 (2d Cir. 2008).  
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between and § 271(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), the federal criminal statute 
that codifies causal imputation. It did so because, to the Court’s mind, 
this statute reflected the common-law doctrine that “two parties who 
divide all the necessary elements of a crime between them are both 
guilty.”264 The Court stated that “we think it unlikely that Congress had 
this doctrine in mind when it enacted the Patent Act of 1952, given the 
doctrine’s inconsistency with the Act’s cornerstone principle that 
patentees have a right only to the set of elements claimed in their 
patents and nothing further.”265 
This remark, however, does not diminish the relevance of 
criminal law examples in this Article because I do not rely on the “both 
guilty” rule reminiscent of the joint tortfeasor scenario in tort. Instead, 
under causal imputation, the causer is liable but the causee often is 
not.266 Moreover, the Court made this statement in the context of the 
narrow § 271(b) issue it was considering, but I contend that § 271(b) 
does not necessarily govern the causer-causee fact pattern.267 Finally, 
the statement reflects a serious misunderstanding of the Federal 
Circuit opinion that the Court was reviewing.268 As confirmed on 
remand, the patentee was not seeking anything broader than the scope 
of its claims, and it won the case when the Federal Circuit simply 
invoked § 271(a), along with the principle of vicarious liability, instead 
of § 271(b) as it did before.269 
Second, and perhaps more important, causation concepts 
underlying the innocent agency doctrine are trans-substantive. Thus, 
the aim of the Article is not necessarily to get patent law to borrow from 
criminal law. Instead, the idea is to use criminal cases to elucidate how 
 
 264.  Limelight Networks, Inc., v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 
(2014). 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  When the offense is strict liability, the causee is generally also liable unless duress was 
involved. See infra Section III.B.2. This is also true in patent cases in which the causer might be 
liable for indirect infringement. But in divided infringement cases, the causee-user is not liable 
because not all steps of the claim could be attributed to it—the causal arrow (or vicarious liability) 
can only lead one to attribution of users’ acts to the manufacturer, not the other way. Nonetheless, 
litigants in cases like Akamai have appeared to focus on joint tortfeasance principles (under which 
the causal arrow runs both ways and both parties’ acts are attributable to one another) to the 
exclusion of causal responsibility. While joint tortfeasance (and joint enterprise) concepts may be 
appropriately deployed when two manufacturers are involved in the infringement, the “one-way” 
causal responsibility applies more readily to the customer-end user scenario. 
 267.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 268.  See, e.g., Jason Rantanen, Judicial Error and Justice Alito’s Hypothetical in Limelight, 
PATENTLY-O (June 3, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/judicial-hypothetical-limelight 
.html [https://perma.cc/S2KW-HDHJ].  
 269.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1022–32 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
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causal responsibility works in general, and, after this principle is 
clarified, to argue how the Patent Act should be properly interpreted. 
Consistent with this point, theorists like Professors Hart and Honoré 
(and others) view their work on causation as applicable to criminal law, 
tort law, and even contract law, and it is unclear why the notion of 
causing acts of others would always be dependent on the area of 
substantive law one is dealing with.270 Causal responsibility appears to 
serve different purposes depending on the area of law in which it is 
deployed, but it functions in roughly the same way throughout the law. 
Whether the concern is justice, efficiency, or another social goal, acting 
through another is not a route to shielding oneself from legal 
responsibility that the law generally approves of.271 
These intuitions help confirm why causation-based liability does 
not analytically hinge upon any showing of intent to cause harm, to 
invade the right of another, or to violate the law in addition to that 
which is required by the underlying offense.272 At bottom, causal 
responsibility holds that, once a person engaged in activity qualifying 
him or her as a causer and demonstrated intent that the causee perform 
certain acts, those acts become the causer’s acts by operation of law.273 
This feature captures the difference between liability based on causal 
imputation and derivative forms of liability, which typically require 
scienter in both criminal law and tort law. In sum, while criminal cases 
provide excellent examples of its operation, the causal responsibility 
principle itself is not logically rooted in the underlying law. 
B. Causal Responsibility in Action 
1. Criminal Law 
Even though criminal law, like patent law,274 sometimes rigidly 
fixates on the principal/accomplice and performer/non-performer 
 
 270.  See generally HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220; see also MOORE, supra note 212. 
 271.  The independent contractor doctrine can often shield those who hire contractors from the 
liability of the contactors’ torts. But this is because “[a]n independent contractor is one who, in 
rendering services, exercises an independent employment or occupation, and represents his 
employer only as to the results of his work, and not as to the means whereby it is to be accomplished.” 
Green v. Soule, 78 P. 337, 339 (Cal. 1904) (emphasis added). 
 272.  See supra notes 46, 145 & 236 and accompanying text. There are criminal cases to the 
contrary, but they demonstrate the fact that not all courts have fully appreciated the idea of causal 
responsibility. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 273.  On this point, see LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 17 (1967) (discussing the legal fiction of 
“qui facit per alum, facit per se,” which is Latin for “he who does the acts through another does the 
act himself”). 
 274.  Cf. supra Section I.B (discussing the history of the development of non-performer liability 
in patent law). 
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dichotomies, the cases illustrate that these distinctions are not so clear 
in practice. The doctrine of innocent agency, in particular, exemplifies 
this blurring. According to Professor Kadish, “[T]he doctrine of 
causation through an innocent agent has been widely applied in a great 
variety of situations.”275 For example, in two pre-1952 decisions,276 the 
Supreme Court rejected lower courts’ formalistic attempts to shield 
from liability those who seemed clearly responsible for a crime and 
possessed the requisite mens rea but did not physically perform the 
actus reus of the offense. 
In substance, the situations the Court dealt with presented a 
kind of a “divided offense” problem in that the entities that had the 
requisite mental state and performed the actus reus were different. In 
patent law, the recent Akamai decision addressed the question whether 
a single entity must perform all the elements of a method patent in 
order for liability to attach.277 In criminal law, the cases that follow 
make clear that the state can prove up an element of an offense—the 
actus reus element—by showing that the defendant caused it to be 
performed by another.278 As long as the defendant has also met the 
mens rea element, he or she is liable—and the “divided offense” problem 
is therefore resolved.  
In United States v. Kenofskey, an insurance agent submitted a 
false claim to the home office of his employer, and his supervisor signed 
the documents “without knowledge of their fraudulent character” and 
put them in the mail in due course.279 The trial court dismissed an 
indictment charging the agent with fraud by means of interstate 
mail.280 It reasoned that “[t]he defendant did not mail the letter” and 
that “the theory that, as he knew the claim would be mailed to the home 
office, in the usual course of the business, for approval before payment, 
he knowingly caused it to be deposited” was “too far-fetched to be 
tenable.”281 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, reasoning that 
the word “cause” in the applicable statute282 “is used . . . in its well-
 
 275.  See Kadish, supra note 42, at 372 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE cmt. at 15 n.5 (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953)); id. at 354–75. 
 276.  As discussed earlier, I am assuming that in passing the 1952 Patent Act, Congress was 
legislating against the background of general legal principles. See supra note 124 and 
accompanying text. Accordingly, pre-1952 cases are particularly relevant. 
 277.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V), 797 F.3d 1020, 1024–25 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam); see supra notes 171–177 and accompanying text. 
 278.  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 279.  243 U.S. 440, 441 (1917). 
 280.  United States v. Kenofskey, 235 F. 1019 (E.D. La. 1916). The mail fraud statute the court 
applied is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2008). 
 281.  United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 442 (1917) (quoting Kenofskey, 235 F. at 1020). 
 282.  Id.:  
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known sense of bringing about, and in such sense it is applicable to the 
conduct of Kenofskey.”283 Notably, the Court was comfortable with 
cause-and-effect language even though an actual person mailed the 
document. It stated that Kenofskey “deliberately calculated the effect 
of giving the false proofs to his superior officer; and the effect 
followed.”284 That officer was “the means by which [Kenofskey] offended 
against the provisions of the statute.”285 The regularity and 
predictability recognized by Hart and Honoré as necessary for a close 
causal relation was present in this case.286 
A subsequent case, United States v. Giles, reinforced these 
points, and more.287 Notably, the statute at issue made liable anyone 
“who makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of the 
association, with intent . . . to injure or defraud”288 and did not include 
the act of causing false entries to appear as an actus reus of the crime. 
Although he was only a bank teller and not a bookkeeper, Giles was 
nonetheless charged with “mak[ing] and caus[ing] to be made” a false 
entry under the statute.289 The prosecution argued that he did so by 
“withholding selected deposit slips for three or four days before 
permitting them to reach the bookkeeping department,” so that the 
ledger “show[ed] false balances” after processing by the bookkeepers.290 
But after a jury convicted Giles of making false entries, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the verdict, observing that “the 
record conclusively shows that defendant neither made the false entries 
nor did anything that could be considered as a direction to the 
bookkeeper to make them.”291 
Acknowledging the majority’s exhortation that criminal statutes 
are to be read narrowly,292 Judge Sibley nonetheless reasoned in his 
 
“Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or artifice to defraud . . . shall, for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be 
placed, any letter, . . . package, writing, . . . in any postoffice, . . . to be sent or delivered 
by the postoffice establishment of the United States, . . . ” shall be punished, etc.  
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting the 1913 version of the federal criminal fraud 
statute). 
 283.  Id. at 443.  
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220, at 13–22, 111–14. 
 287.  300 U.S. 41 (1937). 
 288.  REV. STAT. § 5209 (1918). 
 289.  300 U.S. at 46 (quoting Giles v. United States, 84 F.2d 943, 944 (5th Cir. 1936)); see also 
id. at 45 n.2.  
 290.  Id. at 44. 
 291.  Giles, 84 F.2d at 946, rev’d, 300 U.S. 41. 
 292.  Giles, 84 F.2d at 945 (“It is settled law that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed 
and may not be extended by implication, unless that is clearly demanded by their terms.”).  
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dissent that “strict construction of a criminal law ought not to be 
pressed so far” as to excuse Giles from liability.293 He reasoned that the 
“caused to be made” language under which Giles was charged “is 
broader than the statute if allowed to include cases of accident, neglect, 
or other unintended causations, but if limited to intentional causation 
it does not exceed the statute”—making clear that, in his view, causal 
imputation was implicit in the federal criminal laws.294 Judge Sibley 
argued that “[o]ne may do a criminal deed directly with his own hands,” 
“contrive indirect mechanical means, as a trap or a spring gun,” make 
use of “[t]he acts of an animal or an irresponsible human such as a child 
or a lunatic,” and, finally, of “an innocent human who does not know a 
crime is going forward”;295 no “direction” was needed for liability. He 
concluded that the conviction should stand because “false entries are 
deliberately produced, although through an ignorantly innocent agent” 
by “the bank employee who concocts the plan and achieves the 
result.”296 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth Circuit, 
adopting the position of the dissent. The Court reasoned that “[t]o hold 
that [the statute] applies only when the accused personally writes the 
false entry or affirmatively directs another so to do would emasculate 
the statute.”297 The Court again couched its ultimate holding in the 
language of cause-and-effect, reasoning that “false entries on the ledger 
were the intended and necessary result of respondent’s deliberate 
action in withholding the deposit tickets.”298 Significantly, Giles also 
demonstrates that one can be liable for acting through the 
instrumentality of another even without a specific statutory prohibition 
of this route to a crime, the rule of lenity notwithstanding.299 
Discussing the aftermath of Giles, Professor Lanham explained 
that the causation provision added in 1948 to 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal 
“aiding and abetting” statute, “removes all doubt that one who causes 
the commission of an indispensable element of the offence by an 
innocent agent or instrumentality is guilty as a principal.”300 The 
 
 293.  Id. at 947 (Sibley, J., dissenting). 
 294.  Id. at 946.  
 295.  Id. at 946–47. 
 296.  Id. at 947. 
 297.  United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 49 (1937). 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  See, e.g., United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 300.  Lanham, supra note 232, at 502–03; see also Andrew White, Case Note, The Scope of 
Accomplice Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 386, 393 n.63 (1980) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 80-304, at A5). This provision was further amended in 1951 to yield the version of 
18 U.S.C. § 2(b) that is in force today. There is similar state legislation. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.08.020 (2011). 
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present version of the causation subsection states that “[w]hoever 
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or 
another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as 
a principal.”301 This form of liability is not derivative,302 and it applies 
to all federal crimes, be they murder or strict liability offenses.303 
Numerous other federal and state decisions are to the same 
effect. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Nigro 
v. United States affirmed a conviction of a physician for illegally selling 
narcotics to an addict despite the fact that all the physician did was 
write prescriptions, and pharmacists made the sales.304 The defendant 
argued that there was “no proof that at the time the sales alleged in the 
indictment were made the druggists had guilty knowledge of the 
fictitious character of the prescriptions”305 and therefore there was “no 
crime . . . to aid and abet.”306 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, concluding 
that “a registered physician who issues a prescription [to an addict] . . . 
participates in the illegal sale and is guilty of ‘selling’ within the 
meaning of the statute.”307 According to Professor Lanham, this result 
can be best justified on the causation principle elucidated in Giles,308 
whereby the prescribing doctor “is regarded as the true principal by 
virtue of having caused the actus reus.”309 This case confirms the 
 
 301.  18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2012). For an explanation why the word “willfully” was not intended to 
create an additional mens rea hurdle apart from the requisite mental state for the underlying 
crime, see Weiss, supra note 41, at 1447–51. 
 302.  See supra notes 38–46, 236–240 and accompanying text; see also KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST 
DESSERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 7–8 (discussing the interaction of substantive strict liability 
statutes and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)).  
 303.  For a leading example predating codification of 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (and using the language 
of aiding and abetting) but illustrating the fundamental principles at issue, see United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (“[U]nder [a strict liability statute] a corporation may 
commit an offense and all persons who aid and abet its commission are equally guilty.”); cf. id. at 
286: 
There is no proof or claim that [the defendant] ever knew of the introduction into 
commerce of the adulterated drugs in question, much less that he actively participated 
in their introduction. Guilt is imputed to the respondent solely on the basis of his 
authority and responsibility as president and general manager of the corporation. 
(Murphy, J., dissenting); United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he 
knowledge of an aider and abettor need be no greater than the knowledge of the principal.”); and 
Kadish, supra note 42, at 347 (“The requirement of intention for complicity liability is satisfied by 
the intention of the secondary party to help or influence the primary party to commit the act that 
resulted in the harm.”). It must be added that examples of aiding and abetting of strict liability 
crimes or causing such crimes through an intermediary are rare. 
 304.  117 F.2d 624, 630–32 (8th Cir. 1941). 
 305.  Id. at 630.  
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. at 631 (emphasis added). 
 308.  Lanham, supra note 232, at 502. 
 309.  Id. at 501. 
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intuition that proof of the actus reus element via causal responsibility 
does not require duress or other forms of control over another person. 
This principle, of course, is not limited to federal cases. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia explained the 
principles behind “non-derivative” non-performer liability as follows:  
If the party who actually did the act was innocent of intentional wrong, and the act on his 
part was by procurement of another, it imputes the criminal intent to that other and 
makes him the guilty party, although he was not in any sense an accomplice, co-
conspirator, or aider and abettor of the actor.310 
The court also quoted from a treatise noting that the law holds 
liable one “from whose sole . . . will comes a criminal transaction . . . 
whatever physical agencies he employs, and whether he is present or 
absent when the thing is done.”311 Even if the physical agency is “an 
animate object like a human being,” the law punishes “him whose will 
set the force in motion.”312 As in the federal cases, the idea here is that 
the perpetrator used a human being to perform an actus reus of the 
offense just as one would use a “non-human causal link,” like a 
hammer.313  
An additional observation is that all these outcomes do not 
logically depend on actual innocence of the “innocent agent.” Indeed, 
numerous cases exist in which both the agent and the causer are 
convictable of some crime.314 Perhaps the most evocative stylization of 
this situation, discussed by some courts, is that of Iago and Othello. 
According to Professor Kadish, Iago should be convicted of murdering 
Desdemona, while Othello, the “semi-innocent” agent acting out of 
passion, should possibly be convicted of a lesser crime, perhaps 
manslaughter.315 Professor Glanville Williams agreed: “If a person can 
act through a completely innocent agent, there is no reason why he 
should not act through a semi-innocent agent. It is wholly unreasonable 
that the partial guilt of the agent should operate as a defence to the 
instigator.”316 As the next Subsection shows, in trespass cases the 
causer can be liable under what might better be called a “human 
 
 310.  State v. Bailey, 60 S.E. 785, 787 (W. Va. 1908). 
 311.  Id. (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 649, at 392 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 7th ed. 1882)).  
 312.  Id. 
 313.  See supra notes 33–41 and accompanying text. 
 314.  SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
630–32 (8th ed. 2007). 
 315.  Kadish, supra note 42, at 387. 
 316.  GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 374 (2d ed. 1983). 
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instrumentality” theory,317 even when the causee is liable for exactly 
the same (as opposed to a lesser) offense. 
2. Trespass 
The law of trespass also follows the principle of causal 
responsibility. Consider § 158 of the Restatement of Torts, which 
appears in both the First and Second Restatement.318 This section states 
that “one is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of 
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the 
other, if he intentionally . . . enters land in the possession of the other, 
or causes a thing or a third person to do so.”319 It treats the performer 
of the intrusion—“a third person”—as equivalent to an inanimate 
object—“a thing”—reminding one of Professor Robinson’s description of 
the equivalency between human and non-human causal links implied 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).320 
In either the “third person” or the “thing” scenario, the effect of 
§ 158 is to make the causer of the intrusion liable as though the causer 
himself or herself had intruded, and the performer/non-performer 
distinction is without great significance. Importantly, comment j to this 
section makes clear that duress or even a legal obligation is not required 
to conclude that the defendant caused a third party to enter the land: 
If, by any act of his, the actor intentionally causes a third person to enter land, he is as 
fully liable as though he himself enters. Thus, if the actor has commanded or requested a 
third person to enter land in the possession of another, the actor is responsible for the 
third person’s entry if it be a trespass. This is an application of the general principle that 
one who intentionally causes another to do an act is under the same liability as though he 
himself does the act in question. So too, one who by physical duress causes a third person 
to go upon the land of another or who carries the third person there against his will is 
liable as a trespasser, although the third person may not be liable.321 
 
 317.  This label may be more accurate because the doctrine does not hinge on the innocence of 
the human instrumentality. 
 318.  An argument based on this Restatement section was made in an amicus brief, but it did 
not theorize causal responsibility. See Brief of Amicus Curiae William Mitchell College of Law 
Intellectual Property Institute in Support of Respondent at *20–21, Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (No. 10-6). 
 319.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). The word “intentional” 
here is used not in the sense “not accidental,” but as product of a deliberate act. No awareness of 
any illegality is required, however. See id. § 166; see also CANE, supra note 236, at 32 n.6; KEETON 
ET AL., supra note 168, § 13, at 73–75. For case examples, see Murrell v. Goodwill, 106 So. 564, 
565–66 (La. 1925); and Castleberry v. Mack, 167 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Ark. 1943).  
 320.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 321.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). 
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This comment thus makes clear the causer and the causee are 
treated equally and can be both liable for the same trespass.322 The 
causee, of course, might be exonerated if duress is involved, but the 
causer is liable in any event. Given this Restatement section, the 
Supreme Court’s observation in Akamai that the parties could 
“point . . . to no tort case in which liability was imposed because a 
defendant caused an innocent third party to undertake action that did 
not violate the plaintiff’s legal rights”323 is surprising. Though rare, 
such cases surely exist,324 and the discussion of the effect of duress in 
comment j to § 158 reflects this state of affairs. 
Also worthy of note is the implication that the liability of the 
causer is not “derivative” or “indirect” and the fact that no culpable 
intent (e.g., intent to violate the law) need be shown to establish the 
liability of either the causer or the causee.325 The intent to have another 
person enter the land that happens to belong to a third party, even 
when the conclusion as to ownership is formed by mistake, is all that 
must be proven for liability of the causer.326  
While there are of course significant differences between patent 
infringement and trespass, the two torts have often been compared, and 
the parallel is instructive.327 Both, after all, are strict liability offenses 
premised on conduct responsibility.328 But because it fails to distinguish 
causers from aiders and abettors, patent law generally requires scienter 
on the part of the causer—while trespass does not. The difference in the 
requisite mental states to prove liability of the causer relative to the 
 
 322.  Case law bears this out. See, e.g., Kropka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 91 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1952). 
The liability of the causees may lie in spite of their relative “innocence” under the circumstances 
because of tort law’s aversion to excuses. See generally Goldberg, supra note 151. 
 323.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. (Akamai III), 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2119 
(2014). 
 324.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. Pitzer, 2 W. Va. 264, 273 (1867) (“If the defendant is not liable 
[for trespass], those who forced him to commit the act are, whether he is or not.”); see also Waller 
v. Parker, 45 Tenn. 476 (1867). The courts in these cases found that the causees did not violate the 
plaintiffs’ legal rights because of absence of voluntary action (i.e., due to duress). But cf. Goldberg, 
supra note 151 (arguing that tort law is generally not very receptive to duress defenses and other 
excuses). 
 325.  Even in criminal trespass cases, mistake of fact might not be a defense. See, e.g., State 
v. Gould, 40 Iowa 372, 374 (1875). 
 326.  While some courts have begun to require negligence for proof of trespass, see, e.g., Bailey 
v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 230 S.E. 2d 267, 269–71 (W. Va. 1976), they still do not create heightened 
mens rea hurdles for the liability of the causer versus the causee.  
 327.  See, e.g., Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an 
invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the same foundation, and is 
surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”). But cf. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT 
LAW 211–12 (2012) (distinguishing between patent infringement and trespass).  
 328.  But cf. supra note 326 and accompanying text (noting that some courts have abandoned 
strict liability for trespass generally). 
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causee in patent infringement law versus the law of trespass is difficult 
to explain, particularly given that § 158 reflects “the general principle 
that one who intentionally causes another to do an act is under the same 
liability as though he himself does the act in question.”329 
3. Products Liability 
Manufacturers of defective products are routinely held 
responsible, without a hint of a “divided” or “indirect” tort problem, even 
though they themselves do not perform an act that directly causes a 
compensable injury and thus results in the completed tort.330 In a well-
known case, Codling v. Paglia, Chrysler was held strictly liable (i.e., 
liable without fault) for injuries to persons harmed by someone driving 
one of its vehicles when the car’s steering wheel got stuck, leading to a 
head-on collision.331 The New York Court of Appeals emphasized the 
passivity of the driver and the fact that the manufacturer was 
completely in control with respect to the defect. Because “the product in 
the hands of the consumer is often a most sophisticated and even 
mysterious article,” the court thought it unrealistic to expect the 
consumer to discover a latent defect so as to prevent the accident.332 
That is on the maker of the defective car: the driver is merely an 
unwitting instrument who actuates the harm by doing what he or she 
would normally do with the car—driving it. Thus, when the “intended 
use”333 of a product injures a third party, the driver’s damage-causing 
act is effectively imputed to the manufacturer. As long as the product 
has not been modified or misused,334 the presence of intermediaries 
 
 329.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added). 
 330.  See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86–87 (Fla. 1976). While courts 
have moved away from a pure strict liability approach in design defect cases, see Aaron D. Twerski 
& James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph 
of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1062–63 (2009), strict liability still holds in cases involving 
manufacturing defects, id. at 1063. 
 331.  298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).  
 332.  Id. at 627. 
 333.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). Somewhat 
controversially, perhaps, many states have extended the manufacturer’s liability from intended 
uses to uses that are “reasonably foreseeable.” See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 
454 (Cal. 1978); see also Richard A. Epstein, Plaintiff’s Conduct in Products Liability Actions: 
Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division and Multiple Parties, 45 J. AIR L. & COMM. 87, 91 
n.10 (1979). The “intended use” formulation, however, appears uncontroversial. 
 334.  See generally David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. 
REV. 1 (2000). 
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(retailer, user, etc.) is immaterial to the level of scienter required.335 It 
is strict liability either way. 
While strict products liability for manufacturing defects is a 
doctrine of relatively recent vintage, the rule that the automaker is not 
relieved from direct liability because another entity is interposed 
between it and the injured party has long been a part of the law. In the 
nineteenth century, the much-maligned privity doctrine could, for 
example, exonerate a manufacturer from liability for injuries even to 
the driver when he or she bought a product from a dealer rather than 
the manufacturer.336 The doctrine did make exceptions for products that 
are “imminently dangerous”337 and also ensnared manufacturers who 
actually knew of the defect338—in effect requiring scienter—but, in 
general, privity functioned to shield manufacturers from liability if an 
intermediary was involved. Though based on contractual relationships 
as sources of tort duty, this doctrine also relied on the concepts of 
“remoteness” and “directness,” which are reminiscent of patent law’s 
handling of liability of those who do not themselves perform patented 
steps.339 
Privity, of course, has been mostly gone from tort law for many 
years—since Judge Benjamin Cardozo recognized in the iconic 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case that it is the manufacturer, and 
not the retailer or the user, who is truly responsible for the injuries.340 
The court found that the manufacturer has a duty to guard against 
negligent conduct with respect to the driver in part because “[t]he 
maker of this car supplied it for the use of purchasers from the dealer”341 
and remarked that “[t]here is here no break in the chain of cause and 
effect” that would bar liability.342 To get around the vestiges of privity, 
some courts continued to speak of a manufacturer’s “constructive 
control” of an article after it left the manufacturer’s hands to justify the 
 
 335.  To be sure, the items of recovery in products liability cases relate to physical injury, see, 
e.g., Greenman, 377 P.2d at 700, which is obviously not the form of injury one sees in patent law. 
The purpose of this comparison, however, is that primary liability can be imposed on a defendant 
even though there may be human intermediaries between it and the victim.  
 336.  For an early twentieth century example of privity in action, see Olds Motor Works v. 
Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1911), overruled by C. D. Herme, Inc. v. R. C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 
534 (Ky. 1956); see also Shepard v. Kensington Steel Co., 262 Ill. App. 117 (1931). Of course, privity 
also barred claims of injured third parties against the manufacturer. 
 337.  Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 408 (1852). 
 338.  Lewis v. Terry, 43 P. 398, 399 (Cal. 1896).  
 339.  See William Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1105, 1130 (1960); see also id. at 1124 (discussing “a blanket rule which makes 
any supplier in the chain liable directly to the ultimate user”). 
 340.  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id. 
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imposition of liability.343 In general, though, courts in modern tort cases 
have not been troubled in the least about imposing direct liability on 
the manufacturer, even though the retailer sold the article and the user 
performed the act that was the immediate cause of damage.344 
Indeed, even though parties like a retailer (and, in third-party 
injury cases, also a user) are interposed between the manufacturer and 
the plaintiff, it is often easy to conclude that the manufacturer itself 
“directly” caused the accident by supplying a product that was 
dangerous in its normal, intended mode of operation.345 It is immaterial, 
of course, that the manufacturer was not there when the accident 
occurred.346 The policy rationales for this outcome are compelling—as 
Justice Traynor reasoned, “[T]here is greater reason to impose liability 
on the manufacturer” than on a party “who is but a conduit of a product 
that he is not himself able to test.”347 In the work of Professor (and now 
Judge) Guido Calabresi, these intuitions were formalized in the strict 
liability context under the principle of “cheapest cost avoider,”348 a term 
that refers to an entity that can help prevent the harm at lower cost 
than someone else.349 
 
 343.  Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944). 
 344.  The collapse of privity is generally traced to the expanding notion of duty. See John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1812 (1998). 
But privity can also be viewed as a rule of no causation as a matter of law. See, e.g., Minton v. 
Krish, 642 A.2d 18, 19–21 (Conn. App. 1994) (discussing the causal underpinnings of privity in the 
case of Howard v. Redden, 107 A. 509 (Conn. 1919), which addressed the issues of “causal 
connection,” “conscious agent,” “and intervening cause”). Once the duty limit was lifted, the 
causation question became, according to Prosser, practically determinative, even in actions where 
proof of fault was required. See Prosser, supra note 339, at 1115 (“[I]n cases against manufacturers, 
once the cause of the harm is laid at their doorstep, a jury verdict for the defendant on the 
negligence issue is virtually unknown.”). 
 345.  See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963): 
To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he 
was injured while using the [accused device] in a way it was intended to be used as a 
result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made 
the [accused device] unsafe for its intended use. 
 346.  Cf. supra note 312 and accompanying text (stating that “the law punishes ‘him whose 
will set the force in motion’ ”) (citation omitted).  
 347.  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 443–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, 
J., concurring).  
 348.  CALABRESI, supra note 63, at 135–48; see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, 
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–67 (1972) (arguing the cheapest 
cost avoider should be liable regardless of fault); Megan L. Richardson, Revisiting Strict Product 
Liability: Taking Law and Economics Further, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 195, 197 (1997) (defending 
the effectiveness of the cheapest cost avoider approach). 
 349.  Although the Article focuses on who is the cheaper cost avoider as between the end user 
and the manufacturer, the cheapest cost avoider can, of course, often be the plaintiff. Moreover, 
this specific rationale does not translate to the divided infringement context in patent law because 
the end user cannot generally be held liable in those cases. But the broader notion that acts of 
certain intermediaries could be causally imputed to the party with greater access to the relevant 
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Justice Traynor’s reference to a “conduit” calls to mind the 
causal principles underlying innocent agency, including the notion of 
the “human causal link,”350 and even stronger language along these 
lines has been used. Dean William Prosser, for example, stated that one 
reason why courts rejected privity was that “[t]he middle man is no 
more than conduit, a mere mechanical device, through whom the thing 
sold is to reach the ultimate user.”351 Simply putting into the stream of 
commerce a product that fails when used as intended is enough to 
trigger a duty, and no resort to notions of indirect or vicarious liability 
is needed. In contrast, courts in patent cases have not taken account of 
the sensible principles underlying the collapse of privity, and in fact 
maintained its vestiges by creating significant barriers for holding 
manufacturers liable for patent infringement in analytically parallel 
situations. 
Leaving the analytical structure of liability in products cases 
aside, one may note that even policy debates in the law of products 
liability have resembled in some ways the debates in patent law. For 
example, it has been argued that expansive approaches to liability 
might damage the innovation infrastructure, and the economy in 
general might suffer.352 And it has been said that companies would be 
deterred from placing novel but unproven products on the market for 
fear of liability for as-yet unknown defects.353 Patent law has similar 
tradeoffs: although infringement is an “unlawful activity,”354 expansive 
liability that would squash downstream inventive activity is not 
desirable. 
Of course, compensatory aspects of the two areas of law are 
different—patent infringement actions are meant to make up for 
patentees’ forgone royalties (or lost sales, if provable)355 and encourage 
innovation by future inventors,356 while products liability actions 
typically provide monetary recourse for physical injuries. But although 
 
information, even though that party might not physically perform one or more relevant acts, 
applies equally to indirect and divided infringement. 
 350.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 351.  Prosser, supra note 339, at 1123 (emphasis added). 
 352.  For a critique of modern developments in tort along these lines, see PETER W. HUBER, 
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 14–15, 155–56, 170–71, 224–25 
(1988). 
 353.  See, e.g., id.; see also Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: 
Punitive Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCI. 1395 (1989). 
 354.  Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 355.  And, in proper circumstances, backed up by an injunction. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); see 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 356.  See generally Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 517 (2014). 
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the latter function sounds far more important, it must be remembered 
that we live in a world of extensive first-party insurance, with tort 
actions sometimes characterized as avenues of last resort.357 Moreover, 
as noted, the deterrent function of damages in products liability has the 
same overall features as in patent law—we want to discourage 
particular unlawful behaviors without putting companies out of 
business or making them so risk-averse as to discourage innovative 
behavior.358 But, to my knowledge, no one has proposed dealing with 
these issues in products liability law by recharacterizing the liability of 
manufacturers as indirect or vicarious. As we will see, that form of 
liability is generally reserved for offenders who have a much smaller 
causal role than that which manufacturers typically do in products 
liability cases. 
C. Smaller Causal Role of Aiders and Abettors  
as a Justification for a Higher Level of Mens Rea 
1. Criminal Law 
Significant causal contributions made by defendants in innocent 
agency-type cases are distinguishable from the minimal causal 
requirements for holding defendants liable for aiding and abetting, a 
feature that underscores the difference in the two routes to liability.359 
Consider the case of State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, in which the Supreme 
Court of Alabama allowed a murder case to proceed to trial on an 
 
 357.  See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 
CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1546–49 (1966). 
 358.  In addition, the differences in the effect on the behavior of potential plaintiffs between 
products liability law and patent law must be considered. Professor Keith Hylton argued that, 
while “few potential victims in the torts context make investments conditional on the guarantee of 
compensation from the tort system,” the situation is different in patent law: “If potential patentees 
discover that their patents can be infringed without full compensation, they will have a diminished 
incentive to innovate.” Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement: A Normative 
Approach, 36 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9, 10), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c31bf9e4b02f4c0b4203e6/t/585b378af7e0abfdd0b0d213/1
482373004839/Hylton_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHU4-X2AE]. 
 359.  Some criminal law theorists have characterized accomplice liability as “noncausal” for 
this reason. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice 
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 120, 124–26 (1985); see also 
Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines, supra note 133, at 840–42; Douglas Husak, 
Abetting a Crime, 33 L. & PHIL. 41, 60–61 (arguing that holding causally minor accomplices and 
principals equally liable violates the principle of fair labeling). The “noncausal” characterization 
has been contested. See Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice 
Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 402–20 (2007) (contending that there are problems with 
characterizing accomplice liability as noncausal or structurally distinct from direct liability).  
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aiding-and-abetting theory.360 Tally learned that a telegram had been 
sent to the victim, one Ross, warning him that the Skelton brothers 
were intending to kill Ross. Tally then sent his own message to the 
telegraph operator of the town where Ross ended up as he fled from the 
Skeltons. Tally’s telegram said: “Do not let the party warned get away. 
Say nothing.”361 This message apparently caused a delay in the delivery 
of the warning telegram to Ross, who was killed by the Skeltons in due 
course. 
Tally’s argument for innocence was that Ross would have been 
murdered whether or not he received the first telegram in time. In other 
words, as the court framed it, the question was whether it is “essential 
to [Tally’s] guilt that his act [of interfering with the warning telegram] 
should have contributed to the effectuation of [the Skeltons’] design—
to the death of Ross?”362 In answering the question, the court noted that 
the state would not even have to prove but-for causation363—a mere 
possibility that Tally’s letter could have made a difference would suffice: 
The assistance given . . . need not contribute to the criminal result in the sense that but 
for it the result would not have ensued. It is quite sufficient if it facilitated a result that 
would have transpired without it. It is quite enough if the aid merely rendered it easier 
for the principal actor to accomplish the end intended by him and the aider and abettor, 
though in all human probability the end would have been attained without it. If the aid 
in homicide can be shown to have put the deceased at a disadvantage, to have deprived 
him of a single chance of life which but for it he would have had, he who furnishes such 
aid is guilty, though it cannot be known or shown that the dead man, in the absence 
thereof, would have availed himself of that chance . . . .364 
Scholars have been troubled by the minimal actus reus—and a 
correspondingly small (if not nonexistent) causal contribution to the 
offense—that is sufficient for an aiding-and-abetting conviction.365 Even 
 
 360.  15 So. 722, 722 (Ala. 1894). 
 361.  Id. at 734. 
 362.  Id. at 732. 
 363. Interestingly, in a recent indirect infringement case, the Federal Circuit arguably 
adopted the higher but-for causation standard for proving indirect infringement—a standard that 
is more characteristic of civil as opposed to criminal cases. See Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, courts in patent cases 
have set rigorous criminal law-like mental state requirements and combined them with the 
demanding tort law-like standards of proof of causation—rather than with the more permissive 
approach that one sees in Tally.  
 364.  Id. at 738–39. The modern approach is the same. See, e.g., State v. Carothers, 525 P.2d 
731, 736 (Wash. 1974): 
The legislature has said that anyone who participates in the commission of a crime is 
guilty of the crime and should be charged as a principal, regardless of the degree or 
nature of his participation. Whether he holds the gun, holds the victim, keeps a lookout, 
stands by ready to help the assailant, or aids in some other way, he is a participant. 
 365.  Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines, supra note 133, at 841. To be sure, 
courts require at least a possibility that the accomplice’s act matter to the final outcome—this is 
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though aiders and abettors are usually, and for good reasons,366 
shielded by rigorous mens rea barriers, some have further advocated 
for lesser penalties for minor causal contributors like Tally.367 These 
commentators ask whether it makes sense for someone who sent a 
telegram that might not have even mattered to the outcome be treated 
the same way as the person who ended the victim’s life. 
In contrast, there is much less sympathy for the major causal 
contributors of the kind that one sees in the innocent agency cases, or 
for masterminds like that discussed by Professor Moore.368 While 
troubled by the very idea that a person could be responsible for the 
crime of a different individual, Professor Douglas Husak “concede[d] 
that the act of one individual can be attributed to another” in the 
innocent agency-type case.369 For his part, Professor Joshua Dressler 
argued that, while we may want to treat minor accomplices somewhat 
more generously than we do now, “[l]eniency toward accomplices 
causally tied to the wrongdoing, or actually in control of the events that 
transpire, seems counter-intuitive.”370 Tort scholars have reached 
similar conclusions: “[T]he law is rightly concerned to ensure that 
causally important parties, rather than less (causally) important 
‘peripheral parties,’ compensate the victims of torts . . . .”371 Unlike 
those who use innocent agents to commit offenses, mere aiders and 
abettors are, almost by hypothesis, generally not very causally 
important. While, as a result, we typically hold aiders and abettors 
liable only upon proof of bad intent, the rationale for the elevated mens 
rea breaks down when the defendant is a major causer. 
 
what the Tally court means when it refers to “a single chance of life.” 15 So. at 739; cf. Moore, 
supra note 359, at 432–40 (discussing the notion of “chance-raising” accomplices).  
 366.  See infra notes 388–390 and accompanying text. 
 367.  See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 359. This approach is reminiscent of comparative causation 
in tort. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text (describing how tortfeasors’ different 
levels of causal contribution affect the extent of their liability).  
 368.  See supra notes 216–218 and accompanying text (showing that one can be a major causal 
contributor to actionable harm without physically performing acts constituting elements of an 
offense). 
 369.  Husak, supra note 359, at 57. Professor Husak contended that “when the parties are 
related through agency, when the alleged principal is an innocent instrumentality of the aider, or 
when the parties are co-perpetrators,” attribution is proper because all these cases involve “more 
than mere assistance.” Id. As have many other commentators, Professor Husak also argued 
against the concept of derivative liability: “[T]he basic mistake in positive law is its treatment of 
complicity as a form of derivative liability.” Id. at 58. 
 370.  Dressler, supra note 359, at 118–19. 
 371.  Paul S. Davies, Accessory Liability for Assisting Torts, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 353, 364 (2011) 
(citing Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative Opportunities for 
Deterrence, 111 L.Q. REV. 301, 301–02 (1995)).  
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2. Tort Law 
Aiding-and-abetting liability also appears in tort law. For 
example, in Halberstam v. Welch, a woman was held liable for wrongful 
death because she supported her murderous boyfriend and knew that 
she was enjoying a lifestyle of wealth thanks to his crimes.372 Recently, 
there have been numerous claims of aiding and abetting of civil fraud.373 
All of these cases required an elevated mental state, and rightly so 
because, relative to the actual murderer or fraudster, the level of 
participation the accused party in the commission of a tort in these 
cases is typically that of only a minor causer. Indeed, the law should be 
quite careful before holding a significant other or an accountant liable 
for what appear to be everyday life activities without imposing a 
requirement of proof of culpable intent. No such concern typically exists 
in trespass “causer” cases or products liability claims because the 
defendants are major causal contributors fully in control of the relevant 
events, while the causees or users are merely passive instrumentalities. 
Without always clearly saying so, tort law recognizes the causal 
responsibility principle and makes distinctions between causers and 
aiders and abettors that are very similar to those one encounters in 
criminal law. A non-performer (and, a fortiori, a partial performer)374 
can be held directly liable in appropriate circumstances, and the 
foregoing cases confirm that the causal responsibility principle that 
justifies this result is pervasive. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENT LAW 
A. The Value of Causal Responsibility 
What does all this mean for patent law? Are there cases in which 
end users who perform elements of method claims are mere “human 
causal links” rather than active participants in the offense who only 
derive some measure of support from the defendant? Undoubtedly, 
there are. Many manufacturer-user cases fall into this pattern, and we 
should not hesitate to apply the causal responsibility principle against 
 
 372.  705 F.2d 472, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 373.  See Eugene J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be 
“Privileged” to Assist Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75, 76–85 (2008) (noting that 
courts have experienced a flood of litigation seeking civil liability for aiding and abetting and how 
“in almost every one of those cases, they have recognized the viability of this theory of liability”).  
 374.  Cf. supra note 120 and accompanying text (exploring the similarity between performers 
and partial performers in cases in which causal responsibility is implicated). 
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the manufacturers in such situations.375 In many cases in which certain 
defendants now fall into the indirect infringer box, imposition of 
liability without resort to scienter would not only be consistent with the 
common law causal imputation principles explicated in the previous 
Part, but it would make economic and logical sense as well. 
Manufacturers in many scenarios I have been discussing in this 
Article operate in the field of technology that the patent covers, which 
places them in a much better position than users to prevent the 
performance of steps covered by patent claims.376 It is not difficult to 
conclude that the manufacturers are responsible for users’ acts377 and 
are cheaper cost avoiders than the users, even though the users actually 
execute the steps of the claimed methods.378 Moreover, when a device or 
feature provided can be good for only one thing in its normal mode of 
operation379—and that one thing ends up being covered by steps of some 
method claim—the patent search burdens on the manufacturer are no 
 
 375.  Even if a few individual users might become aware that they are infringing (as through 
a demand letter), in many cases of the sort I address in this Article a large majority of users would 
not normally be aware of the patent, suggesting that the user base is passive in the aggregate. In 
other words, the goal is to examine how the average user would be expected to behave in a given 
scenario—and we see this approach in products liability cases. See supra Section III.B.3. Perhaps, 
if a defendant can prove that particular users to whom they provided infringing instrumentalities 
knew of the patent and were, therefore, not passive, the defendant could show that causation is 
cut off with respect to those users, and damages should be reduced accordingly (assuming that the 
defendant-manufacturer’s conduct and mental state do not otherwise meet the current elements 
for liability under § 271(b) or (c)). The use of the reasonable royalty approach to damages might 
complicate this analysis somewhat, see Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 955–76; see also id. at 921 n.42, 
but it should still be sufficiently flexible to allow a reduction of damages. Potentially, this approach 
could reduce incentives for certain plaintiffs to approach end users with patent demand letters. 
See infra notes 382–383 and accompanying text.   
 376.  Indeed, while end users would need to develop new technical expertise to search for and 
understand the patents in the field, those designing the products do not need to invest in technical 
knowledge solely to avoid the infringement. See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent 
Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012): 
[A] consumer who carries out a routine task on a smartphone may well be using 
inventions claimed in dozens of patents. If the smartphone manufacturer has 
incorporated those inventions without a license, the consumer’s use, even if innocent, 
may well constitute an act of infringement. . . . [T]his scenario is important because it 
presents a potential proximity concern: the patent infringement rule binds a diffuse 
audience of patent law outsiders.  
 377.  See supra notes 242–243 and accompanying text (explaining that it can be sensible to 
hold the real causer of the harm strictly liable). 
 378.  See supra notes 347–348 and accompanying text (reasoning that manufactures may be 
in the best position to prevent the harm even without physically performing harm-causing acts). 
 379.  Cf. Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 38) 
(describing situations in which some machines’ sole use is to perform a patented process); see also 
Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1319 (2015) (proposing a theory of direct patent infringement based on 
the creation of CAD files that enable the creation of products via 3D printing).  
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higher than would be expected under the general strict liability regime 
of patent infringement. There is no guessing as to what users would do. 
As in the trespass context, users who perform every step of the 
claim may also be exposed to lawsuits given the strict liability nature 
of direct infringement.380 Nonetheless, removing barriers that shield 
non-performers from liability under what looks like patent law’s version 
of privity (and, perhaps, of “the last human wrongdoer” rule)381 in the 
method claim infringement cases would, on the margins, likely help 
shift the focus of many patent owners from the passive user to the truly 
responsible manufacturer.382 That would be a welcome development, 
particularly given the recent outcry over what appear to be abusive 
lawsuits against technology users, many of which involve method 
claims.383 
The concerns are somewhat different in the divided 
infringement context—end users are generally not subject to suit—but 
causal responsibility can help here as well. As noted, the Federal 
 
 380.  There may be ways to immunize end users from patent infringement suits under current 
law. For an interesting proposal, see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of 
Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571 (2016) (contending that, in some circumstances, end users are not 
performing intentional or volitional acts required for liability to attach). 
 381.  See supra note 168 and accompanying text (explaining that “the last human wrongdoer” 
is not the only wrongdoer). It must be noted that, even with the mens rea obstacles in place, the 
patentees can still obtain prospective relief even in the worst-case scenario (e.g., when the 
defendant successfully shows a good-faith belief of noninfringement up until judgment). See supra 
notes 142–143 and accompanying text. 
 382.  Of course, when patentees are determined to pursue end users solely because they are 
“easy targets” in the sense they are more likely to settle the case than the manufacturer, this 
rationale breaks down. But one imagines that, in what are now indirect infringement cases, 
elevated mens rea elements must play some role in the decision whether to pursue manufacturers 
as opposed to end users for at least some potential plaintiffs. In addition, it appears that as part 
of the attitude of “method patent exceptionalism” that I criticize in this Article and Professor 
Holbrook criticized in his, see Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript 
at 38), the current law makes it difficult to stay cases against end users when a manufacturer 
actually wants to be in the suit and attempts to bring a declaratory judgment action in order to 
protect end users of its products. See Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent Law’s 
Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1618 (2013). 
 383. Immunize End Users from Patent Trolls, RACKSPACE (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www 
.rackspace.com/blog/immunize-end-users-from-patent-trolls [https://perma.cc/6ULX-WBW9] 
(“ ‘End users’ are you and me: small businesses, developers, students, professionals, and other 
ordinary Americans who use technology in our daily lives. We didn’t steal somebody’s idea.”); Julie 
Samuels, Hey, Patent Trolls. Pick on Someone Your Own Size, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 
23, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/hey-patent-trolls-pick-someone-your-own-size 
[https://perma.cc/TP9T-HD7U]; see also Love & Yoon, supra note 382, at 1618–20 (recounting the 
reasons why the manufacturers are in a much better position to defend certain patent 
infringement lawsuits than the end users and noting that many such lawsuits involve method 
claims). Consistent with this Article, these authors advocated for removing the rigid line between 
method and system claims in their proposal to make it easier to stay lawsuits against end users, 
id. at 1638–39, but they did not challenge the present mens rea requirements in suits against 
manufacturers. Id. at 1638 n.118. 
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Circuit’s current approach overextends the doctrine of vicarious 
liability and leaves many unanswered questions.384 In addition, it 
obscures the factual similarity between the non-performer and partial-
performer defendants that provide products or features whose only 
purpose is to perform steps some or all of which happen to correspond 
to elements of an asserted method claim. Thus, patent law in both 
indirect and divided infringement contexts can benefit from causal 
responsibility to impute acts of users to manufacturers-defendants. If 
the Patent Act were read with this principle in mind, some thorny 
problems and unintuitive results would become more tractable. This 
Part develops these intuitions with the help of the philosophical and 
doctrinal ammunition provided in the preceding parts of this Article. 
B. Indirect Infringement 
1. Applying the Framework 
As discussed earlier, proof of patent infringement by inducement 
presents high mens rea hurdles.385 Besides having to show that the 
defendant specifically intended for the performer to carry out acts that 
happen to be infringing, the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant 
knew of the patent covering the invention—and the defendant can 
counter with a good-faith belief of noninfringement. This heightened 
form of the “bad purpose” approach appears to correspond to what 
Baruch Weiss considered to be “the most rigorous mental state imposed 
by the criminal law.”386 In the context of the criminal cases that he 
discussed, Weiss concluded that this rule is aberrant387—in part, no 
doubt, because it flouts the maxim that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse.388 
 
 384.  See supra Section I.D. 
 385.  See supra Section I.C. 
 386.  Weiss, supra note 41, at 1454–55 (discussing a case in which a court, relying on the word 
“willfully” in 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), concluded that it was not “adequate to simply charge the jury that 
to find intent it could consider whether defendant knew that he was doing ‘something unlawful’ or 
that he was doing ‘something wrong’ in some general way”; instead, “the defendant also had to be 
aware of the precise reporting requirements at issue, and must have specifically sought to frustrate 
them” (citing United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567–70 (3d Cir. 1994))); see also Jonathan S. 
Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 189 (2011) (“[T]he putative 
contributory infringer must be aware of the full legal status of the patent and the relationship 
between the direct infringer and the patent holder. This is an extraordinary requirement, one that 
is present few other places in the law.”). 
 387.  Weiss, supra note 41, at 1454–55. 
 388.  See supra note 319 and accompanying text. To be clear, in patent cases (and trespass 
cases), the issue is not ignorance of the law but of others’ rights. 
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As the discussion of aiding and abetting suggests, the 
requirement of an elevated mental state is justifiable when the 
defendant provides some general product or service, or assists the 
performer in some relatively minor way.389 And Weiss made clear that 
mens rea hurdles even of the “bad purpose” variety can sometimes be 
useful for protecting a marginal participant in a wrongdoing.390 But the 
patent law’s bad-purpose-style requirement applies to all non-
performer cases, without regard to the extent of the defendant’s role in 
the infringement. The causation framework, in contrast, provides a 
significantly more flexible approach that takes into account the 
defendant’s level of participation. 
Although the heightened form of the “mens rea of illegality” rule 
is now firmly entrenched in patent law, causation principles might 
relieve the plaintiff from having to meet it in certain scenarios. Some 
non-performer cases, in which defendants can now be charged only with 
indirect infringement, can be recharacterized as direct infringement 
claims based on the notion that the manufacturer has caused the 
customers’ acts. What would be their features? Recall that causing acts 
of another might include provision of a critical tool that enables that 
person’s performance of specific acts, and only those acts, intent that 
those acts be carried out (or substantial certainty that those acts would 
occur),391 and perhaps also instructions describing how to carry out the 
acts or some other facts giving rise to information asymmetry between 
the non-performer and the performer.392 In general, to borrow from 
Professors Hart and Honoré, the non-performer might in some way 
provide the performer with reasons for acting.393 And finally, 
reinforcing the above, the performer’s role is in some way passive in 
that the performer, predictably, carries out acts as expected by the non-
performer—all of which makes the latter more causally important 
relative to the former.394 
 
 389.  See supra Section III.C. 
 390.  See Weiss, supra note 41, at 1481–83. 
 391.  On the substantial certainty requirement as a route to proving the intent element of an 
intentional tort and its role in secondary liability in copyright law, see Yen, supra note 137. For a 
leading tort case dealing with this issue, see Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955). 
 392.  See supra Section III.B. 
 393.  HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220, at 153. 
 394.  See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text; see also Bartholomew & McArdle, supra 
note 261, at 713 (discussing a copyright case in which “the court relied on ‘an additional step in 
the causal chain’ to find no liability on the part of the defendant credit card company, explaining 
that there was no causation because, even though the credit card company made infringing 
websites profitable, there still had to be a decision by the websites and their users to engage in the 
infringing conduct in the first place” (citations omitted)). 
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Consider, under this framework, the case of Lucent Technologies 
v. Gateway.395 Lucent sued Microsoft on indirect infringement theories 
for providing Outlook software, which (when utilized by end users) led 
to the infringement of a patented method of scheduling appointments 
with the aid of a graphical interface.396 Microsoft produced the 
underlying technology, supplied the tool adapted to perform steps 
covered by certain method claims, and provided instructions that 
helped ensure that the tool would be used to do exactly that.397 Given 
these facts, the verdict of infringement in that case was independently 
upheld on both § 271(b) (inducement) and § 271(c) (contributory 
infringement, which requires an article that is “especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of [the patent], and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use”398) 
theories.399 As a result, the actus reus here was a “double” actus reus—
Microsoft provided an article adapted to infringe and took affirmative 
steps through marketing and instructions that helped ensure that the 
steps in the process were performed.400 Under these conditions,401 
 
 395.  See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 396.  Gateway and Dell were also sued in that case. Id. They were accused of indirect 
infringement based on their sales of Microsoft software capable of practicing the patented methods. 
Id. at 1308. The case against Gateway and Dell based on causation principles is more difficult to 
make out than the case against Microsoft. These entities did not design the accused software, but 
rather passed it along in the stream of commerce. Under products liability principles in some 
states, they would be liable along with Microsoft, though they might have a case for 
indemnification against it. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 22(a)(2)(ii) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). But 
many states have recognized the unfairness of exposing innocent retailers to liability and have 
shielded them by statute in various ways. For a review, see Jim Sinunu & Amy Kott, Protection 
for Retailers: Developments in Strict Product Liability and Indemnification, WESTLAW J. PROD. 
LIAB. (Thomson Reuters), June 11, 2012, at 14. Under the rationale of the causation approach, 
Gateway and Dell should probably not be directly liable because, as hardware rather than software 
makers, they are not in control of the relevant technology—though that is, of course, open to 
debate. Certainly, such distinctions are well within the institutional competence of courts. See 
infra notes 421–423 and accompanying text. 
 397.  See Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1320–24. 
 398.  35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
 399.  Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1320–24. 
 400.  Id. at 1320–25. The fact that only a feature of the product was infringing does not change 
the analysis. See, e.g., Ricoh Co. v Quanta Comput., Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(stating that one cannot “escape liability as a contributory infringer merely by embedding [the 
infringing feature] in a larger product with some additional, separable feature”). Nonetheless, the 
double actus reus is particularly important in cases like this: when the patented feature is a part 
of a larger product sold by the infringer, the instructions can help guarantee that the feature does 
not, so to speak, “sit on the shelf.” As Lucent makes clear, though, the relative insignificance of the 
infringing feature in the larger product affects the magnitude of damages. 580 F.3d at 1323–36. 
 401.  Under current law, Lucent also had to prove both Microsoft’s intent that users perform 
certain acts and that it intended to infringe specific patents, which Lucent was able to do. Lucent 
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performance of the claims’ steps by end users was fully expected and 
did in fact occur.402 In terms of Microsoft’s causal contribution, the 
circumstances here were far removed from an aiding-and-abetting-type 
scenario. 
What else in the case leads to the conclusion that causal 
responsibility applies? Most customers, often individual users, likely 
knew nothing about the underlying technology—accentuating the 
information asymmetry apparent on these facts—and Microsoft 
undoubtedly gave them a reason for acting by providing the software.403 
The customers also did not get to modify the program in any way and 
did not seek to incorporate it into some larger products like commercial 
developers might404—they were generally just regular computer users. 
And finally, the customers could not get any value out of the date-picker 
feature by using it in a way other than infringing. 
On these facts, it is not difficult to conclude that Microsoft 
caused the users’ acts and should have been liable directly and not 
merely derivatively, thereby allowing Lucent to bypass the knowledge-
of-the-patent element mandated by the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of § 271(b) and (c). In other words, direct infringement under § 271(a) 
can be pled on facts like these, while § 271(b) (or (c)) would be 
unnecessary. Besides software,405 cases in which a manufacturer 
provides articles that end up performing the steps of a certain method 
patent when used in their own intended mode of operation might 
include technologies like medical devices,406 pharmaceuticals,407 and 
diagnostic kits.408 The causation principle and its effect of lowering the 
mens rea, then, would apply to some of these cases as well.409 
 
Techs., 580 F.3d at 1320–24. Under the proposed approach, only the former would be required in 
these circumstances because of the heightened actus reus. 
 402.  Without the performance of the asserted claim’s steps, there could be no liability—either 
under the current approaches or under my proposal. 
 403.  This is so even if, at some point, the direct infringers might have learned that a patent 
covers the devices they are using. See supra note 375 and accompanying text. 
 404.  See Love & Yoon, supra note 382, at 1618 (discussing the importance of this fact in the 
context of the authors’ proposal for reviving the customer suit exception); supra notes 333–334 
(describing user passivity in products liability cases). 
 405.  For another example, see i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 850–52 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 406.  See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 502 F. App’x 945 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Tyco 
Healthcare Grp. LP v. Biolitec, Inc., No. C-08-3129 MMC, 2010 WL 3324893 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 
2010). 
 407.  See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 408.  Cf. infra notes 445–446 (discussing divided infringement scenarios involving diagnostic 
patents). 
 409.  While some causal imputation claims would undoubtedly produce difficult, borderline 
cases, see supra note 396, my goal in this Article is not to resolve numerous potential fact 
situations, but to provide the proper legal framework in which decisions by fact finders would be 
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2. Implementation Under the Patent Act 
The statutory grounding of the proposal in the previous Section 
is the word “uses” in § 271(a). As discussed earlier, it would not be 
contrary to the language of the Patent Act to hold that an accused 
infringer “uses” a claimed method by performing one or more claim 
steps through the instrumentality of another.410 Nonetheless, those who 
would prefer to retain the formal performer-direct/non-performer-
indirect dichotomies based on statutory classifications might find the 
direct liability label (i.e., rooting the liability in these scenarios in 
§ 271(a)) objectionable. There is, in fact, significant support for this 
objection in the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, which at 
times implies that all non-performer liability falls under the indirect 
infringement provisions of § 271.411 To address this objection, one could 
label the conduct I am concerned with in this Article as a form of 
§ 271(b) inducement that requires a lower mens rea than other types of 
inducement. In particular, the conduct could be distinguished from the 
form of inducement in which a device or a feature provided to a 
consumer has both infringing and noninfringing uses. The latter form 
of inducement is more akin to aiding and abetting, which makes it 
consistent with the present requirement of elevated intent. 
There is no rule mandating that every case that arises under 
§ 271(b) (or (c)) require the same mens rea hurdles to establish liability. 
Indeed, the phenomenon in which a particular statutory provision 
engenders different interpretations depending on the circumstances, 
described by Professor Jonathan Siegel as a statutory “polymorphism,” 
is not unusual.412 Professor Mark Lemley made a proposal along these 
lines in 2005, suggesting a “sliding scale inquiry in which a more 
specific intent to infringe is required to find liability if the defendant’s 
conduct is otherwise less egregious.”413 Professor Lemley argued that 
the knowledge-of-the-patent requirement should be omitted in cases in 
which the non-performer is a causer, but he would essentially limit the 
 
made. Certainly, there will be sufficiently “egregious” scenarios. Cf. Lemley, supra note 7, at 226 
(arguing for the use of a sliding scale inquiry that is partially based on the egregiousness of a 
defendant’s conduct). One example, discussed throughout this Article, is the Microsoft Outlook 
case, in which Microsoft’s causal responsibility for the end users’ acts could have been fairly 
straightforward to make out for a fact finder. 
 410.  See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 411.  See supra notes 121–127 and accompanying text. 
 412.  For a discussion of the concept of polymorphism in statutes, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The 
Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339 
(2005). For an example in patent law in particular, see id. at 363 n.131. 
 413.  Lemley, supra note 7, at 226; see also id. at 244 tbl.1 (detailing one possible approach to 
a sliding scale between a defendant’s conduct and the requisite level of intent for liability). 
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sweep of causation theories to cases in which corporate officers caused 
the corporation to act.414 As I have demonstrated in this Article, the 
concept of causation is not so narrow. And applying causal 
responsibility would lead to the same result (i.e., lowered intent 
requirement) whether its home is under § 271(a) or § 271(b). 
However the proposed solution might be implemented, 
causation theories would not swallow all non-performer liability in 
patent law.415 As an initial matter, if causal imputation is adopted 
under § 271(b) in the “polymorphic” manner proposed by Professor 
Lemley, then the problem is moot. And if the framework is adopted 
under § 271(a), § 271(b) will still continue to govern cases in which the 
accused device has noninfringing uses,416 barring the possibility of a 
§ 271(a) claim under a causation-type theory. In such cases, the causal 
connection between manufacturers’ and users’ acts would be attenuated 
because, even when the manufacturer provides instructions or 
otherwise encourages customers to use the device in an infringing way 
(as required for § 271(b) liability),417 the customers could still get value 
out of the device by utilizing it in a noninfringing way. The degree of 
predictability necessary for the regularity implied in a close causal 
relation would be missing.418 
Subsection 271(c) presents a further challenge. As I have 
argued, a significant determinant of causal responsibility in patent law 
is the provision of an article or feature that infringes a patent claim in 
its only operating mode. But isn’t that exactly the situation that § 271(c) 
is supposed to address? That subsection holds a defendant liable for 
offering to sell, selling, or importing “a material or apparatus for use in 
practicing a patented process, . . . knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, 
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use.”419 Would the nonstaple nature of the 
 
 414.  Id. at 244–45.  
 415.  See also infra Part V (addressing objections to the use of causal responsibility theories to 
determine patent infringement). But cf. Lemley et al., supra note 82, at 260–62 (describing the 
reluctance of courts to find liability in “truly divided claims” so as to avoid collapsing direct and 
indirect infringement). 
 416.  See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (analyzing infringement issues involving a medical device that is capable of performing both 
a patented method and a method in the public domain); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 
793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (analyzing an inducement claim where there are alternative 
solutions to the Rubik’s Cube puzzle); see also supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 417.  See, e.g., Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668–69 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 418.  HART & HONORÉ, supra note 220, at 13–22, 111–14. 
 419.  35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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article ensure causal regularity and therefore render § 271(c) 
superfluous if such cases are pled under § 271(a) on causation theories? 
This objection can be addressed by reiterating that causation 
analysis involves not only the acts of the causer but the character of the 
putative causee, resulting in the identification of two general classes of 
users of “nonstaple articles” under § 271(c). When a user is a participant 
in the area of technology that the patent at issue is directed to, the 
expectation is that the user might conduct a patent search so as to 
prevent the infringement. When the user is a passive customer, as in 
Lucent, the story is different because the customer cannot plausibly be 
expected to perform such a search.420 Judge Cardozo recognized an 
analogous distinction in MacPherson, noting that “[i]f to the element of 
danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons 
other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then . . . the 
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it 
carefully.”421 
Of course, the nature of the danger in patent cases is not a car 
accident but patent infringement, but the problem is analytically 
similar. The robustness of the causal link between the manufacturer’s 
design and the harm-causing act depends on our expectations on how 
the end user is expected to behave, and in tort law, courts make these 
sorts of distinctions between participants in the stream of commerce all 
the time. The passivity of end users (such as car drivers, with respect 
to their ability to discover latent manufacturing defects) figures 
prominently in products liability cases, and for good reasons.422 In 
contrast, in some § 271(c) cases, the accused infringer sells a nonstaple 
article to another manufacturer423 who would be expected to perform a 
patent clearance search and at least try to deal with potential 
infringement issues. 
The further objection is that Congress could not have possibly 
had the distinction between different kinds of end users in mind when 
it enacted § 271(c). Again, the objector will point to evidence in the 
legislative history that § 271(c) (and (b)) were enacted with the purpose 
of making sure that the patentee still has an effective remedy when 
faced with a large number of end users, no matter their character.424 
 
 420.  Cf. Janis & Holbrook, supra note 376, at 117 (comparing smartphone users and 
manufacturers with respect to their expected knowledge of patents covering the smartphone 
device). 
 421.  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (emphasis added). 
 422.  See supra Section III.B.3. 
 423.  See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187–89 (1980). 
 424.  See Contributory Infringement: Hearings on H.R. 3866 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong. 1 (1949) [hereinafter Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4] 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
634 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:565 
Maybe so. But Congress also did not repudiate the principle of causal 
responsibility,425 which would distinguish between active and passive 
end users. Accordingly, if § 271(c) must apply to the causation cases, it 
too can be a polymorphic provision,426 requiring a higher mens rea (i.e., 
knowledge of the patent requirement) in active-user cases and lower 
mens rea in passive-user cases.427 Although, in its recent indirect 
infringement opinions, the Supreme Court pointed to stare decisis and 
concluded that its hands are tied with respect to mental state barriers 
for establishing liability under § 271(b) and (c),428 it has not dealt with 
the question of statutory polymorphism, or with the notion that non-
performer infringement can be pled as direct on a causation theory. 
Indeed, the case for dropping the elevated mens rea is 
particularly strong in the “double” actus reus cases, in which 
defendants exhibit both § 271(b) (providing instructions) and § 271(c) 
(providing nonstaples) behaviors to customers who passively perform 
claimed steps to get the value out of a product.429 While courts have 
treated sales of nonstaples as conclusive evidence of intent that the 
claimed steps be performed,430 there is significance to the accused 
 
(subtitle of the bill: “A Bill to Provide for the Protection of Patent Rights Where Enforcement 
Against Direct Infringers Is Impracticable . . . .”). 
 425.  Cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 52 (distinguishing between linguistic questions and legal 
questions in developing a framework for the interpretation of statutes); see also Mathews, supra 
note 109, at 273: 
As a remedy for the invasion of a statutory right the action of contributory infringement 
should be as valid today as it was in 1886. Naturally the evidential factors required to 
establish concert or concurrence between the parties have varied somewhat as the 
personnel and views of the courts have changed, but this is a matter of pure case law 
and . . . the decided cases should stand unless there is a compelling reason to overturn 
them. No such reason is present today, except possibly to repudiate a few individual 
cases that may have improperly held joint and several liability to exist where the facts 
were insufficient to show concert . . . . There is no more reason now to change the basic 
patent law of joint tort liability than there is to change the basic general law of joint tort 
liability.  
(emphasis added). 
 426.  See supra note 412 and accompanying text (discussing “polymorphism” in statutory 
interpretation). 
 427.  It might be, though, that liability in some active user cases is best analyzed under joint 
tortfeasance principles. See supra Section I.B (discussing the history of patent infringement 
liability for non-performing parties). 
 428.  Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926–28 (2015); Glob.-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765 (2011). 
 429.  See supra note 400 and accompanying text (detailing “double actus reus” cases with both 
a § 271(b) and a § 271(c) claim). For a recent article suggesting that courts have focused too much 
on intent and not enough on conduct in induced infringement cases, see W. Keith Robinson, Only 
a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent Infringement, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 
(2015).   
 430.  See A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and 
Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 91–92 (1982) (collecting cases). 
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infringers’ advertising and other actions taken to encourage the 
performance of the claimed steps. The acts of spelling out the function 
of the nonstaple product generate demand, ensure that the infringing 
feature does stay idle when it is a part of a larger product,431 and 
underscore the information asymmetry between the manufacturer and 
the user. 
One could make a strong argument that a mere sale of a 
nonstaple product “especially adapted to infringe” within the meaning 
of § 271(c) to anyone is sufficient to attribute acts of a user to a 
manufacturer on a causation theory. If so, then this argument would 
further undermine the already controversial (and badly fractured)432 
Aro decision, a § 271(c) case that spawned various mens rea 
requirements in the way of holding indirect infringers liable.433 
Nonetheless, I believe that the causation approach fits more naturally 
with fact patterns involving passive users than with those involving 
firms working in the areas of technology implicated by the asserted 
patents, and who may use the nonstaple device to build another 
product. As noted,434 the latter are in a much better position than the 
former to search for relevant patents, and cannot really be viewed as 
“conduits.”435 
Moreover, the distinction between active and passive 
intermediaries is central to causal responsibility cases. In particular, 
the capabilities of the performing party could make a difference to 
whether the non-performing party could be charged with causing as 
opposed to aiding and abetting an offense,436 with the attendant effect 
on proof of mental state to hold the non-performing party liable. Indeed, 
a performer’s relative passivity can be an important predicate to 
treating the non-performer as a principal as opposed to accomplice in 
 
 431.  See supra note 400 (detailing a case in which an infringing product’s feature had no 
noninfringing uses). 
 432.  Glob.-Tech, 563 U.S. at 764. 
 433.  Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964); see supra 
note 139 and accompanying text (criticizing the rule stemming from Aro). As noted earlier, the 
elevated mens rea is probably appropriate for § 271(b) cases in which the accused instrumentality 
has both infringing and noninfringing uses, but likely less so in many § 271(c) cases. 
 434.  Supra notes 420–423 and accompanying text. 
 435.  See supra notes 345–347 and accompanying text (discussing knowledge asymmetries 
between manufacturers, retailers, and users in products liability cases); see also Robertson, supra 
note 61, at 934–35 (discussing knowledge asymmetries between buyers and sellers with respect to 
patents covering the product being sold). 
 436.  See SMITH, supra note 234, at 118 (“The stronger the accessory’s causal role and the 
weaker the perpetrator’s, the greater should be the inclination to label the actions as principal 
through innocent agency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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those jurisdictions that maintain the distinction.437 Accordingly, the 
common law of causal responsibility as applied to patent cases requires 
a user that is “passive” with respect to—generally untutored in—the 
underlying patented technology. 
C. Divided Infringement 
The causation framework also provides an alternative route for 
addressing the problem that the Federal Circuit dealt with in Akamai, 
or at least supplies further elaboration and content to the current 
test.438 The solution parallels that proposed for cases in Section B, 
except here the user performs all, rather than just some, elements of 
the patent claim that has been asserted. As before, the test for 
attribution is whether one party has caused the act of another. 
Accordingly, we can ask whether the device is capable only of 
performing the infringing steps when used as intended, or whether the 
user can get value out of the device in ways other than by performing 
the remaining steps (or perhaps the one remaining step) of the asserted 
claim. And we can also ask whether the manufacturer intends for a 
passive user to perform the steps that happened to be covered by patent 
claim and encourages the user to do so. 
Under this approach, one would probably conclude that the 
defendant website operator in Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 
the real estate search case discussed in Section I.D, caused users to 
select geographic areas within a map.439 This is what the website was 
designed to do, and the “click on the map” instruction encouraged users 
to perform the claimed selecting steps while the website server 
performed the rest.440 To be sure, the users were interested in finding 
real estate, and they voluntarily chose to use defendant’s website rather 
than some other route to getting the information. But once that choice 
was made, users’ role with respect to the claimed steps was passive and 
 
 437.  Cf. supra notes 229–234 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances in which 
the imputation of the causee’s acts onto the causer might be warranted). 
 438.  See supra Section I.D (discussing issues related to divided infringement and the current 
test employed by courts). 
 439.  709 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 440.  See supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text. The Federal Circuit in Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. (Akamai V) did note the significance of instructions 
in its imputation analysis under the “vicarious liability” framework. 797 F.3d 1020, 1024–25 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). For an article focusing on this aspect of the case, see Olajumoke 
Obayanju, What Next? Exploring the Federal Circuit’s Expansion of Direct Infringement Liability 
Post-Akamai v. Limelight and the Process It Took to Get There, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 319 (2016) 
(focusing on the “instructions” aspect of the Akamai litigation). 
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the execution of the steps more or less inevitable.441 The defendant 
provided a tool and gave end users reasons for engaging in actions 
corresponding to the claim’s elements, as well as instructions that 
helped push the end users further toward carrying them out.442 These 
actions, executed by users who were likely unfamiliar with the 
underlying technology, were fully expected and predictable when finally 
made. These features of the case suggest causal regularity,443 which 
confirms that users’ acts are attributable to the defendant under the 
principle of causal responsibility. Because it thus performed all the 
steps either by itself or via causal imputation, the defendant should be 
liable as a direct infringer. Given Limelight’s active participation in 
creating the conditions for the performance of the “tagging” step in 
Akamai—after all, Limelight developed the method requiring tagging—
the same result should obtain in that case, but without the need to rely 
on vicarious liability.444 
Facts in divided infringement cases vary widely, and, in some, 
questions might arise about the sufficiency of the causal link needed to 
attribute the conduct of the user to the manufacturer or service 
provider. Interesting scenarios are presented by method of treatment 
patents involving diagnostic tests. As explained by Professor 
Christopher Holman, a typical set of facts in suits for infringement of 
such patents might include the following: “[A] physician might order a 
diagnostic test, but an independent laboratory performs that test and 
provides the physician with the results, and he or she uses the 
information to inform treatment decisions.”445 In an article written 
before the Federal Circuit’s most recent en banc decision in Akamai, 
Professor Holman contended that “[i]n the absence of an agency 
relationship between the physician and laboratory, which often will not 
exist in practice, it will be difficult to hold any party liable for 
infringement under the current interpretation of divided infringement 
 
 441.  Of course, a user could simply abandon the search for real estate properties after doing 
the initial zooming, but to complete its search, the user would have to go through all these steps. 
 442.  See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text (discussing causation as it relates to 
interpersonal interactions). 
 443.  See supra note 418 and accompanying text (discussing causal regularity). 
 444.  See supra notes 177–184 and accompanying text (analyzing critiques of the Federal 
Circuit’s rule requiring a website operator to exercise “direction or control” over users of its website 
for the operator to be liable). 
 445.  Christopher M. Holman, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Limelight 
Compounds the Challenges Facing Biotechnology Innovators After Mayo and Myriad, 33 
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 135, 137 (2014); see also Erik P. Harmon, Note, Promoting the Progress 
of Personalized Medicine: Redefining Infringement Liability for Divided Performance of Patented 
Methods, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 967 (2014). 
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law.”446 While Akamai may have changed this result, it might be argued 
that causation theory provides another ground, with deep roots in the 
common law, for justifying the physician’s (or medical researcher’s) 
liability. Thus, the laboratory test step might be imputed to the person 
ordering the test, who would then be deemed to perform all of the steps 
of the patent claim. In some cases, however, the defendant’s causal role 
might be insufficient for imputation because he or she did not design 
the test. In other words, the chain of causation might be cut off by an 
intermediary (e.g., the laboratory) that is in the business of doing 
research into new testing methods, and can therefore be considered 
active rather than passive. 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., an appeal 
recently decided by the Federal Circuit,447 provides an interesting test 
of both the Akamai approach and of the causal imputation route to 
liability in the medical context. In this case, the representative asserted 
claim was drawn to: 
An improved method for administering pemetrexed disodium to a patient in need of 
chemotherapeutic treatment, wherein the improvement comprises: 
a) administration of . . . folic acid prior to the first administration of pemetrexed disodium; 
. . . and 
c) administration of pemetrexed disodium.448 
Pemetrexed disodium is a chemotherapeutic agent whose toxic 
side effects are reduced by prior administration of folic acid. The 
“divided infringement” issue in this case arose because patients are 
supposed to self-administer folic acid (step (a)) before step (c), which is 
performed by a medical professional. The district court concluded that 
the Akamai test was met because “taking folic acid in the manner 
specified is a condition of the patient’s participation in the pemetrexed 
treatment as prescribed by the patent, and is necessary in order to 
receive the benefit of such treatment.”449 The court, therefore concluded 
that steps (a) and (c) were attributable to a single entity (the physician) 
and found the defendant liable for infringement. The Federal Circuit 
affirmed, concluding that the district court’s finding that physicians 
“ ‘condition’ pemetrexed treatment on the administration of folic acid” 
was not clearly erroneous.450 In addition, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
 
 446.  Holman, supra note 445, at 137. 
 447.  845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
 448.  U.S. Pat. No. 7,772,209, claim 12 (filed July 11, 2007). 
 449.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1042 (S.D. Ind. 
2015), aff’d, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 555 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 12, 2017). 
 450.  Eli Lilly, 845 F.3d at 1366. 
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that by following the dosage and administration information in the 
drug’s label, the physicians established the manner and timing of the 
patients’ taking of folic acid within the meaning of Akamai.451  
Professor Rachel Sachs argued that the district court’s 
conclusion was problematic because “the doctor-patient relationship 
simply does not qualify as one involving direction or control, at least 
under the current doctrine,” noting that “the autonomy of the patient 
has taken center stage in the physician-patient relationship.”452 She 
contrasted Eli Lilly with Akamai by emphasizing the significance of the 
fact that, in order to receive the benefit of Limelight’s services, its 
customers were contractually obligated to perform certain steps—while 
the patients in Eli Lilly were under no contract.453 This is a powerful 
critique because the very idea that a doctor is “vicariously liable” for the 
patient’s acts has an oddly incoherent ring to it. To be clear, doctors in 
some jurisdictions can be liable for harm to third parties occasioned by 
their patients as a result of negligent treatment, as when driving under 
the influence of improperly prescribed drugs.454 But these are actually 
best understood as causal responsibility cases, with impaired patients 
actuating the harm stemming from their doctors’ negligence.455 
Professor Sachs is correct that doctors are not controlling the 
patients in cases like Eli Lilly. But the doctors do give the patients 
strong reasons for acting in such a way as to self-administer folic acid 
within the meaning of the claim456 by developing a course of treatment, 
providing a tool (i.e., prescribing the folic acid), and instructing the 
patient to take this treatment supplement. In addition, although 
patient autonomy may be the hallmark of the modern doctor-patient 
 
 451.  Id. at 1367–68. 
 452.  Sachs, supra note 20 (manuscript at 8–9). 
 453.  Id. (manuscript at 7–10). In its opinion affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit 
confirmed that a contract was not required for attribution under Akamai, but was careful to note 
that “[o]ur holding today does not assume that patient action is attributable to a prescribing 
physician solely because they have a physician-patient relationship.” Eli Lilly, 845 F.3d at 1368. 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found no infringement as a matter of law where the plaintiff “has 
not pointed to any evidence that would permit attribution of patent- and doctor-performed steps” 
to a defendant accused of infringing a diagnostic patent. Medgraph, Inc v. Medtronic, Inc., 843 
F.3d 942, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2016).   
 454.  Watkins v. United States, 589 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1979); Welke v. Kuzilla, 375 
N.W.2d 403, 404 (Mich. App. 1985). But see Lester ex rel. Mavrogenis v. Hall, 970 P.2d 590, 598 
(N.M. 1998) (holding that a doctor does not have a duty to third party non-patients where the risk 
of injury to that third party is low). 
 455.  See, e.g., Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. 1980) (“[I]f an 
examination fell below that standard and resulted in certifying an unfit person as physically 
qualified to drive a commercial vehicle, the probable consequences would be a highway accident 
causing loss or injury to a third party or parties.” (emphasis added)). 
 456.  See supra notes 391–393 and accompanying text (discussing causation of other parties’ 
actions, especially in situations with information asymmetries between parties). 
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relationship, there is an information asymmetry between doctors and 
patients with respect to patents that cover treatment methods. All this 
means that it would probably be reasonable for a fact-finder to conclude 
that doctors are causing their patients to perform the folic acid 
administration step. And the causation approach, which is not rooted 
in control over another person, is not as vulnerable to Professor Sachs’s 
critique of the district court’s vision of the doctor-patient relationship 
implied in the reliance on the vicarious liability doctrine. But if by 
adopting “vicarious liability,” the Federal Circuit actually meant to 
install the doctrine of causal responsibility as governing divided 
infringement cases, then Eli Lilly can be understood in terms of causal 
attribution of patients’ actions to the doctors. It is telling, indeed, that 
the phrase “vicarious liability,” so prominent in Akamai, is not to be 
found in the Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly opinion. 
Eli Lilly illustrates still another aspect of causal responsibility. 
The accused infringers in that case were not doctors or researchers, but 
generic drug manufacturers proposing to market the chemotherapeutic 
agent with an indication of use in a folic acid combination therapy, and 
they were successfully sued on an inducement theory.457 Can their 
behavior trigger causal responsibility with respect to the downstream 
actions of medical professionals, so that the causal chain runs from 
making and marketing the drug, through the medical professionals, 
and ultimately to the patients’ self-administration of the folic acid? The 
answer must be no because there are, for example, research uses of 
pemetrexed that do not require the concomitant utilization of folic 
acid.458 Moreover, the medical researchers and doctors should be 
familiar enough with the relevant technology such that the ability to 
discover and understand the relevant patents would be realistic and 
perhaps even expected.459 Therefore, while the researchers or doctors 
infringe the patents directly (i.e., once the patients’ acts are attributed 
to them under the analysis described above), the drug manufacturers 
can probably be held liable only as aider and abettors, not as causers. 
The chain of causation is attenuated by active intermediaries who can 
 
 457.  Eli Lilly, 845 F.3d at 1368–69. 
 458.  See, e.g., T.M. Marti et al., Prolonged Pemetrexed Pretreatment Increases Efficiency of 
Ionizing Radiation Combination Therapy and Correlates with the Persistence of Treatment-
Induced DNA Damage in Lung Cancer Cells, 11 J. THORACIC ONCOLOGY S65 (2016); Marie 
Morfouace et al., Pemetrexed and Gemcitabine as Combination Therapy for the Treatment of Group 
3 Medulloblastoma, 25 CANCER CELL 516, 517 (2014). 
 459.  In this kind of a case, patents are particularly easy to find because the Food and Drug 
Administration requires patents covering specific drugs to be listed in the so-called “Orange Book.” 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS (36th ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5J6-62VK]. 
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use pemetrexed in multiple ways and who can more readily find the 
relevant patents (and thereby at least theoretically prevent the 
infringement) than the average passive consumer in cases like Lucent 
or Move.460 
D. Causal Responsibility in Other Areas of IP 
At this stage, my critiques of patent law’s approach to non-
performer infringement and suggestions for change might be usefully 
compared to what actually happens with non-performer infringement 
theories in areas of intellectual property law other than patent. First, 
as Professor Felix Wu astutely observed, accused instrumentalities in 
copyright law have substantial noninfringing uses basically by 
hypothesis.461 Copyright law exists to protect content, not technology, 
and devices that might enable copyright infringement are agnostic with 
respect to whether the content they help find, copy, display, or download 
is copyrighted or not. Same with trademark law—it makes no difference 
to the eBay platform, for example, whether the item it helps sell is 
counterfeit or not. Thus, many cases of non-performer infringement in 
copyright and trademark law resemble traditional aiding and abetting, 
and the mens rea obstacles to prevail against those engaged in activities 
that are neutral with respect to the underlying intellectual property 
right at issue are reasonable and necessary.462 Not so in many patent 
cases. Patent law protects the underlying technology, and the 
manufacturer typically has the ability to design (or redesign) its product 
in a way that is infringing or noninfringing—or negotiate with the 
 
 460.  A complication with brand-generic cases is that the patentee does not have to wait for 
the infringement—just proposing to market a drug for a particular use covered by a patent is 
enough to support the inducement claim. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (providing an example in which a generic drug manufacturer encourages a 
particular use not covered by a patent). 
 461.  Felix Wu, Secondary Copyright Remedies, Presentation at the 14th Annual Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference (Aug 8., 2014); see also Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
supra note 194, at *10–11 (arguing that “content-neutral providers of Internet services should not 
be saddled with potentially staggering strict copyright liability due to acts of infringement by some 
of their users”); cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 960 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting in the copyright context that “the producer of a technology 
which permits unlawful copying does not himself engage in unlawful copying—a fact that makes 
the attachment of copyright liability to the creation, production, or distribution of the technology 
an exceptional thing”); Bartholomew & McArdle, supra note 261, at 713 (discussing the remoteness 
of the relationship between indirect infringement defendants and the wrongful activity in some 
copyright infringement cases). 
 462.  Cf. supra Section III.B (discussing causal responsibility in criminal law and tort law). 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
642 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:565 
patentee for a license.463 In contrast to defendants in indirect copyright 
and trademark infringement cases, manufacturers that provide articles 
lacking substantial noninfringing uses are not, therefore, dependent on 
users’ whim with respect to the infringement. In the cases I have been 
considering, the users have no choice but to perform the steps covered 
by the claims if they would like to get value out of the device.464 
Second, copyright (and trademark) cases show that the line 
between direct and indirect infringement is not always clear-cut, and 
that both the provider and the user can both be direct infringers465—an 
issue that has not been fully appreciated in patent law. In Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,466 
for example, it was contested whether the accused bulletin board 
servers operated by the defendant merely enabled the making of copies 
of copyrighted materials by users or whether the servers were so 
involved in the copying that it could be said that the defendant operator 
infringed directly. The issue in Netcom was not framed in causal 
imputation terms—rather, the district court grappled with whether the 
servers were actually making copies themselves.467 Nonetheless, 
Netcom specifically alluded to the idea that some threshold causal 
contribution, which the court also characterized as “volition,” must be 
made before a defendant could be held directly liable.468 
Related issues arose in a number of cases469—including, most 
recently, in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 
 
 463.  Of course, the control might be more limited if the manufacturer is “ambushed” by a 
patent, but it is still the case that the manufacturer, not the user, is the right entity to deal with 
the infringement. 
 464.  For an extended argument that the substantial noninfringing use doctrine that copyright 
law borrowed from patent’s contributory infringement provision never caught on in practice, see 
Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s 
Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007); see also 
Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941 (2007). 
 465.  See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 n.9 (2005) (“[T]he lines between direct infringement, 
contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.” (quoting Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984))). For a trademark law example in 
which the plaintiff made colorable claims of direct and indirect trademark infringement against 
the same defendant, see Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 101–10 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 466.  907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368–73 (N.D. Cal. 1995). I thank Shyam Balganesh and Patrick 
Goold for drawing the relevance of the issues in Netcom and Aereo to this Article to my attention. 
 467.  Id. at 1367–73. 
 468.  Id. at 1370 (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some 
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to 
create a copy by a third party.”). Interestingly, in this copyright case the service provider was 
passive (and therefore a minor causal contributor), but the user was active. Id. at 1372–73. The 
result that the provider could only be liable indirectly, if at all, under these circumstances, is 
consistent with the approach in this Article. 
 469.  See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining 
that the “requirement of causation remains an element of a direct [copyright] infringement claim” 
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which reached the Supreme Court.470 Aereo involved a technology that 
enabled the streaming of specific content, often copyrighted, directly to 
the service’s subscribers upon the subscribers’ request.471 And even 
though the users-subscribers in Aereo selected the content and pressed 
“play” (or, more accurately, clicked on the link), the service provider was 
held to be directly liable for infringing the public performance right of 
the owners of the copyrighted content.472  
Espousing a view that seems to underlie the assumptions behind 
some of the patent cases considered in this Article, Justice Scalia in 
dissent maintained that the defendant, Aereo, could not be directly 
liable because it did not perform a volitional act that was the immediate 
cause of the infringement.473 But the six justices in the majority were 
not persuaded. The majority, to be sure, never mentioned volition and 
justified Aereo’s direct liability based on a particular statutory 
provision of the Copyright Act designed to deal with cable providers, 
and noted Aereo’s similarity to a cable provider.474 But the Court was 
also moved by the active involvement of the service provider in the 
infringement. For example, the Court found it important that “Aereo 
sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, 
many of which are copyrighted, almost as they are being broadcast,” 
and that “[i]n providing this service, Aereo uses its own equipment, 
housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’ homes.”475 In 
short, Aereo was in control. 
Professors Rebecca Giblin and Jane Ginsburg maintained that 
courts should build on Aereo by explicitly focusing on the level of 
 
and distinguishing the case at issue from Aereo); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 
F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he purpose of any causation-based liability doctrine is to identify 
the actor (or actors) whose ‘conduct has been so significant and important a cause that [he or she] 
should be legally responsible.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 168, 
§ 42, at 273)); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004) (“While the 
Copyright Act does not require that the infringer know that he is infringing or that his conduct 
amount to a willful violation of the copyright owner’s rights, it nonetheless requires conduct by a 
person who causes in some meaningful way an infringement.”); cf. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network 
L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “operating a system used to make 
copies at the user’s command does not mean that the system operator, rather than the user, caused 
copies to be made”), further proceedings, 160 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting the characterization 
of an internet-based DVR service as passive and noting that “just because the subscriber has to 
click a button to initiate the streaming does not mean that FilmOn X does not perform”), appeal 
docketed, No. 16-7013 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). 
 470.  134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 471.  Id. at 2507. 
 472.  Id. at 2507–11. 
 473.  Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 474.  Id. at 2508–10 (majority opinion). 
 475.  Id. at 2506. 
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participation of the accused entity in the infringement.476 These 
scholars, in effect, agreed that we should abandon the formalistic 
performer/non-performer and direct/indirect dichotomies in cases in 
which they are counter to commonsense notions of legal 
responsibility.477 What Professors Giblin and Ginsburg described is 
causal responsibility in action, and their reading of Aereo and their 
proposal for extending it are consistent with the approach adopted in 
this Article. Another commentator, Professor Lee Burgunder, reached 
a similar conclusion, even adopting the language of agency. He noted: 
Aereo gave the copyrighted content to individuals and had them do what the company 
would not have been allowed to do itself. Hence, in reality, the customers acted more like 
agents of Aereo who collectively participated in a scheme that resulted in public 
performances of the copyrighted materials under the umbrella of the company. The 
volitional conduct . . . occurred when Aereo chose to give subscribers access to content that 
it had no right to offer.478 
These insights call to mind considerations behind the adoption 
of the doctrine of innocent agency.479 They are also consonant with 
Professor Husak’s argument that legal liability can sometimes be 
predicated not on a defendant’s act that is the immediate cause of harm, 
 
 476.  Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New 
Controversies and Unresolved Questions after the Supreme Court’s Decision, 38 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 109, 153–54 (2015). Professor John Golden also noted the connection between issues in 
patent law, particularly in Akamai, and in Aereo. See John M. Golden, Common Law in the 
Interpretation of Statutes: Akamai v. Limelight at the Federal Circuit, NEW PRIV. L. BLOG, (June 
16, 2015), https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/06/16/common-law-in-the-interpretation-of-
statutes-akamai-v-limelight-at-the-federal-circuit-john-golden [https://perma.cc/DQ2A-369W] 
(discussing the concept of “avoision” in patent and copyright law). 
 477.  Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 476, at 130 (arguing that services like Aereo “have a 
significant degree of active participation in the [infringing] activity, particularly if the services 
select among the broadcast channels whose programs the services record and retransmit”); see also 
Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 194, at *16 (arguing that Aereo 
“recognized that the distinction between active and passive participation remains a central part of 
the analysis of direct infringement”). 
 478.  Lee B. Burgunder, The Supreme Court Performs the Right Notes for Dish in Aereo, 17 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 845, 869 (2015); see also Dallas T. Bullard, The Revolution Was Not 
Televised: Examining Copyright Doctrine After Aereo, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899, 923 (2015) 
(“The purpose of [the causation] analysis is not to determine who pushed the button or turned the 
dial, but rather who is to be held liable for encroachment into the copyright holder’s exclusive 
domain. . . . [The question is] who is close enough to the event to be considered the most important 
cause.”); Robert C. Denicola, Volition and Copyright Infringement, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1259 (2016) 
(similar). 
 479.  See supra Section III.A. Another Supreme Court intellectual property case that arguably 
adopts the causal responsibility approach is Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013). In 
that case, Bowman essentially attempted to escape responsibility for infringement of patents on 
genetically modified soybean seeds by arguing that the seeds do the growing by themselves. The 
Court was not persuaded, reasoning that “it was Bowman, and not the bean, who controlled the 
reproduction . . . of Monsanto’s patented invention.” Id. at 1769. 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
2017] CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY & INFRINGEMENT 645 
but on his or her control of the situation.480 And if nothing else, the 
argument for causation-based direct liability is stronger in the patent 
context that in the Aereo context because, as the Aereo dissent noted, it 
is the subscriber, not the equipment provider, who selected the 
content.481 
V. OBJECTIONS 
Several closely related objections, to which I already alluded 
throughout the Article, might be raised against this approach. I 
mention and address each one in turn. 
First, one might contend that it is very difficult to find relevant 
patents and figure out whether they cover a product.482 Thus, the 
argument continues, some level of scienter must be retained in patent 
law, at least for indirect infringement cases.483 This critique, however, 
cannot be squared with the notion that patent infringement is, as a 
baseline matter, a strict liability offense484—and the linchpin of strict 
liability is causation, not fault.485 While fault can be appropriately 
 
 480.  See Husak, supra note 39, at 77–82 (describing “the control requirement” for liability). 
Husak’s article is about criminal liability, but nothing in the reasoning limits his theory to criminal 
law. See also Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2438 
(2007). 
 481.  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2513, 2517 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The “duty to police” issues that come up in other areas of IP also provide interesting comparisons 
with patent law. For example, in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98–100 (2d Cir. 2010), 
the evidence showed that eBay took great pains to attempt to prevent trademark infringement 
arising from sales of counterfeit products by users of its platform, sometimes without prompting 
from trademark owners like Tiffany. See also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (setting forth the 
responsibilities and safe harbors for internet service providers with respect to infringing content 
uploaded by users); Denicola, supra note 478, at 1276–83 (discussing the role of the duty to police 
in determining whether a defendant should be directly liable in copyright infringement cases). But 
what would it mean for a manufacturer of a device without any noninfringing use to police 
infringement by the end users of its products? Sell the device and then ask the customer not to use 
it? The fact that these very questions sound incoherent further points out the oddity with patent 
law’s indirect infringement doctrine. It is, of course, generally more difficult to obtain the 
information needed to discover patent versus copyright or trademark infringement. But, as the 
next Part further explains, the non-performer in many patent cases is still in a better position than 
the performer to get this information. In contrast, in copyright and trademark infringement cases 
raising duty-to-police issues, the performers (i.e., end users) often seem to be in a better position 
to avoid the infringement. 
 482.  Incidentally, concerns about patent notice have sometimes been voiced without 
distinguishing direct or indirect infringement. See, e.g., Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, 
Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289 (2012). 
 483.  See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
 484.  For a discussion of similar issues in trespass, another strict liability tort, see supra notes 
319–327 and accompanying text. 
 485.  Cf. Bartholomew, Cops, Robbers, and Search Engines, supra note 133, at 830–40 
(discussing responsibility for intellectual property infringements based on causation). 
3-Karshtedt_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/14/2017  4:55 PM 
646 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:565 
deployed to protect marginal participants in the infringement,486 that 
reasoning does not apply to the activities of defendants discussed in this 
Article because of their extensive causal roles in ensuring performance 
of method claim steps. It is counterintuitive to protect such defendants 
with mens rea shields, while at the same time exposing their customers, 
who can in no way be expected to find patents covering the infringing 
products, to strict liability. Moreover, when the manufacturer knows 
that the device it provides is only good for performing particular steps, 
the search burdens it must face are in no way unfair.487 
A second objection is that the proposed approach in effect 
extends the coverage of method claims, which by design cover steps 
rather than apparatuses or devices.488 This objection maintains that the 
patent owner should live with the consequences of the choice to claim 
the invention in method form.489 Moreover, it is thought in divided 
infringement cases in particular that the problems with enforcement 
could have been avoided with better claim drafting.490 
However, what I propose is not an extension of the scope of 
method claims. This is because liability based on causing actions of 
others is recognized as an inherent route to legal responsibility 
throughout the law. As noted, when a another human being is used as 
an instrumentality, the “extension” of liability is no more an extension 
than in the circumstances in which an inanimate object is utilized in 
carrying out some act.491 Causal responsibility is even recognized in 
criminal cases in spite of the rule of lenity492 and the principle that 
courts cannot create new crimes.493 There is no evidence that Congress 
in 1952 repudiated causal responsibility in patent law. Instead, it 
sought to codify common-law theories of non-performer liability in an 
 
 486.  Cf. supra Section III.C (discussing the minor causal role of some aiders and abettors in 
criminal law and tort law). 
 487.  See supra notes 377–379 and accompanying text. 
 488.  For an extended argument to this effect in the divided infringement context, see Brendyn 
M. Reinecke, Note, Akamai: Patent Claims Are Now Broader than the Invention, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 
1231. 
 489.  Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 82, at 256–63 (discussing difficulties in enforcing method 
claims where steps are performed by multiple actors). Had the claims been drafted in apparatus 
form, a manufacturer could be successfully sued, in many cases probably without controversy, for 
direct infringement based on “making” or “selling” the article. See Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 923 
n.53 (discussing method and apparatus claims); see also supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 490.  See Lemley et al., supra note 82, at 276 (“In general, patent applicants will be well served 
by seeking claim coverage designed to trigger infringement liability . . . .”). 
 491.  See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 492.  See supra notes 292–303 and accompanying text. 
 493.  KADISH ET AL., supra note 314, at 137 (“[N]early all American jurisdictions . . . have now 
abolished the common law doctrine that courts can create new crimes.”). 
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infringement statute that, as the accompanying House Judiciary 
Committee Report confirms,494 incorporates the concept of causation. 
Moreover, as many have argued, it would be odd to have a law 
of infringement under which many method claims are left with an 
ineffective or very limited remedy.495 This state of affairs might be 
particularly problematic when method claims might be the only choice 
for protecting inventions in a certain field of technology.496 But under 
the current approach, cases have arisen in which such claims cannot be 
effectively enforced because end users are practically unreachable and 
manufacturers are protected by elevated mens rea requirements. In 
other cases, method claims might be completely unenforceable based on 
cramped versions of the “single entity” rule.497 These results are 
puzzling because a part of the purpose of codifying infringement in the 
Patent Act was to ensure that someone would be held liable when suits 
against end users would have been impractical,498 and to overrule the 
Mercoid cases,499 which held that assertions of “contributory 
infringement” were improper attempts to extend the patent right.500 
More generally, many pre-1952 cases involved method claims that 
courts were loath to enforce, and a part of the impetus behind the 1952 
 
 494.  H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, supra note 121, at 2402. 
 495.  See, e.g., Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 21–38) 
(arguing that courts’ treatment of method claims has resulted in doctrinal inconsistencies); 
Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism, supra note 140, at 342–43 (arguing that infringement of many 
patents on important technologies will not be compensated during the time before the accused 
indirect infringer is faced with a demand letter or an infringement complaint); Greskowiak, supra 
note 177, at 398–404 (criticizing the law’s countenancing of easy circumvention of certain method 
patent claims.). 
 496.  See Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 36–38) 
(discussing patent eligibility of method claims); cf. Christopher T. Abernethy, Comment, Cruel 
Hand of Bilski: Culminating the Shortsighted Crusade for Marginalization of the ‘Process’ Patent 
(May 2009) (unpublished comment), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1420205 [https://perma.cc/ 
5JH3-CMW8] (describing challenges to the patent eligibility of method claims directed to certain 
subject matter). 
 497.  See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 498.  See Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4, supra note 424, at I (subtitle of the bill: “A Bill To 
Provide for the Protection of Patent Rights Where Enforcement Against Direct Infringers Is 
Impracticable . . . .”). The cases preceding the 1952 Patent Act and the legislative history of the 
Act reflect this very concern. See supra Section I.A. 
 499.  H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, supra note 121, at 2402; see also Aro Mfg. 
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 492 (1964) (“Congress enacted § 271 for the 
express purpose of reinstating the doctrine of contributory infringement as it had been developed 
by decisions prior to Mercoid, and of overruling any blanket invalidation of the doctrine that could 
be found in the Mercoid opinions.”). See generally Rich, supra note 102. 
 500.  Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944); 
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670 (1944). 
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Patent Act was to address that very problem.501 The whole point was to 
make method claims easier to enforce, not more difficult. Finally, as 
Professor Holbrook explained,502 it seems odd that the distinction 
between method and apparatus claims has been more or less been 
ignored or eliminated for the purpose of patent eligibility503 and 
exhaustion of patent rights via authorized sales of products 
“substantially embodying” method patents,504 but in infringement cases 
courts insist on placing formalistic limits on method claim enforcement. 
The objector would argue, finally, that many patents having 
method claims are “bad” patents in terms of overall quality and, 
moreover, might be misused in the hands of unscrupulous non-
practicing entities.505 These may well be meritorious critiques, but the 
performer/non-performer distinction, on its own,506 is a legally infirm 
ground for dealing with them. In addition, though there is certainly 
room for debate,507 it would seem that if the desired policy outcome is to 
invalidate as many bad patents as possible, we should encourage 
defendants to actually challenge patent validity as opposed to allowing 
 
 501.  One example is B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942), which is discussed in 
Rich, supra note 102, at 533–34; see also Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 
3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong. 151–57 (1951) 
(statement of Giles Rich criticizing courts’ non-enforcement of method patents and arguing for 
adoption of § 271(b) and (c) to fix the problem); and Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4, supra note 
424, at 26–27 (statement of Stephen Cerstvik, similar). 
 502.  Holbrook, Method Patent Exceptionalism, supra note 87 (manuscript at 36–37); cf. Love 
& Yoon, supra note 382, at 1638, n.117 (noting “interchangeability in many instances of apparatus 
and method claims” (quoting Joel Voelzke, Patent Marking Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a): Products, 
Processes, and the Deception of the Public, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 317, 319 (1995))). 
 503.  See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); see also Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (criticizing excessive reliance 
on “draftsman’s art” in patent eligibility analysis (citation omitted)). But cf. Oddi, supra note 430, 
at 109 (“There appears to be an unarticulated assumption on the part of the majority in [Dawson 
Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980)] that in many, if not all, instances of 
contributory infringement the patent owner is being deprived of patent protection due to some 
technicality of patent law.”). 
 504.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 634 (2008). But cf. Carnegie Mellon 
Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (taking a step toward 
achieving some logical consistency between how method claims are treated for the purpose of 
determining exhaustion versus measuring damages). 
 505.  See Love & Yoon, supra note 382, at 1620 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of [non-
practicing entity] suits involve method claims . . . .”). 
 506.  See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text. 
 507.  See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 159, at 1033–38 (criticizing the elimination of the defense 
of good-faith belief of invalidity to indirect infringement based on the argument that the absence 
of this defense chills patent validity challenges); cf. Love & Yoon, supra note 382, at 1638 n.118 
(suggesting that accused indirect infringers may focus on proving noninfringement or invalidity 
rather than lack of requisite intent). 
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them to prevail based on the lack of requisite intent.508 In addition, it 
goes without saying that litigating intent and other subjective mental 
states is fact-intensive and expensive509—a fact that further reinforces 
the conclusion that the complicated “bad purpose” approach to intent 
should be adopted only in cases in which it is really necessary to protect 
providers of general platforms (as, for example, in many copyright 
cases),510 and when its utilization is justifiable by general common-law 
principles. 
CONCLUSION 
Imputation of acts of performers to non-performers based on 
causal principles is a long-standing route of assigning legal 
responsibility. This approach provides a path to liability in 
circumstances where strict adherence to notions of liability styled as 
“derivative,” “secondary,” or “indirect” leads to unsatisfying results in 
various areas of law. More generally, causal imputation deals with 
scenarios in which elements of an offense are divided between multiple 
parties, which is exactly what we see in some patent cases. 
Problems with the direct/indirect dichotomy may be one of the 
reasons that criminal law has moved away from a formalistic 
distinction between principals and accomplices. And tort law has often 
eschewed direct and derivative labels altogether. Yet patent law 
continues to rely on performer/non-performer and direct/derivative 
distinctions to a fault, erecting high hurdles to hold non-performers 
liable and ignoring the notions of causing acts of others. But as long as 
we have a law of patent infringement that explicitly recognizes non-
performer theories of liability, we must accept imputation theories 
based on causation. These theories are consistent with intuitive notions 
of legal responsibility and, indeed, with the specific observation that, in 
many patent infringement cases, the non-performer is more responsible 




 508.  This argument, of course, does not apply to patents rendered unenforceable in the divided 
infringement context. 
 509.  Cf. Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental and Emotional States in United 
States Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 297 (2000) (“The patent system must decide 
whether the mental states currently present in the patent laws are helpful for a system intended 
to foster today’s technology, or whether in truth these mental states just make patent litigation 
more complicated and expensive.”). 
 510.  See supra Section IV.B. 
